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INTRODUCTION
This interim report, produced by the Mineta Transportation Institute’s National Transporta-
tion Security Center (MTI/NTSC), a National Transportation Security Center of Excellence 
(NTSCOE) for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), provides data on terrorist 
attacks involving explosives and incendiary devices against public transportation targets 
throughout the world and presents some preliminary observations drawn from those data.
The report is part of MTI/NTSC’s contribution to the Interagency Counter-IED (improvised 
explosive device) Working Group managed by DHS.  The Working Group began its work 
in 2008; MTI has been and will remain an active member. 
The data presented here are drawn from the MTI database of attacks on public surface 
transportation, to which additional incidents are added either as they occur or as they are 
painstakingly culled from existing collections that do not focus specifically on transportation 
security. On November 12, 2009, the database contained 1,384 attacks. Over the next 
three months, the database grew to 1,648 attacks, an average of 88 attacks a month. MTI 
is currently incorporating hundreds of attacks from the 1,700 transportation-attack entries 
in a chronology maintained by the RAND Corporation, which has graciously provided the 
data to MTI. The analysis in this report is based on the database as of February 20, 2010; 
the most recent attack included was the attempted bombing of a train station on February 
12, 2010, in West Bengal, India.
Many of the charts in this report were used in a presentation to the DHS Counter-IED 
Working Group on November 12, 2009, but they have been updated, and some calculations 
have changed. The original charts are reproduced in the Appendix. The full database was 
also briefed to the TSA/FTA Safety and Security Roundtable on July 14, 2009, in Portland, 
Oregon. The briefing to the Counter-IED Working Group focused on bomb attacks, with 
the emphasis on bomb attacks against train targets. Since then, additional data on bus 
targets have been included to provide broader treatment.
The charts have been improved by combining average lethality calculations with distribution 
calculations. They now show not only where, against what, and how most attacks take 
place, but also which of the attacks are most lethal. For all attacks, lethality is calculated 
as average fatalities and injuries per attack (FPA and IPA); for attacks involving explosives 
or incendiaries, lethality is calculated as average fatalities and injuries per device (FPD 
and IPD). 
For ease of discussion, we use the term “bomb attack” to refer to attacks that involve the 
use of both explosives and incendiary devices.  Incendiary devices, the most famous of 
which is the Molotov cocktail—a crude device consisting of gasoline in a bottle with a 
flaming cloth as a timer and detonator—have been used with surprising lethality against 
transportation targets. In a 2007 attack on the “Peace Train” at Dewanna, India, four devices 
killed 68 people and wounded 50. Official government assessments have noted that when 
explosives become difficult to acquire, terrorists turn to incendiaries to create fires.
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This interim report will be revised and peer-reviewed and will be published as a formal 
MTI report in spring 2010. The charts will be updated, based on MTI’s most current data, 
and some of the preliminary conclusions in this study probably will change.  
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ThE MTI DATABASE
OVERVIEW
MTI/NTSC started publishing chronologies of attacks on public surface transportation in 
1997. These chronologies, which included some, but not all, such attacks between 1920 
and 2000, were published in two MTI reports, the first in 19971 and the second in 2001.2 
These seminal publications on public surface transportation security helped to inform 
Congress; federal, state, and local government agencies; and transit operators. Serious 
criminal attacks were included because terrorist groups observe and learn from criminal 
tactics and also sometimes conduct criminal actions to finance their operations.
In 2009, MTI/NTSC began creating a database that includes its own chronologies and all 
attacks captured in the second release of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) created by 
the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 
based at the University of Maryland, a DHS Center of Excellence. The entries in this 
database, which we refer to as UMSTART, contain narratives of the details of surface 
transportation attacks between January 1, 1998, and December 31, 2007. MTI/NTSC 
regularly updates its database to include attacks found in lists created by U.S. and 
other government and industry entities. The lists either are not specifically designed for 
transportation threat and security analysis or lack details and require painstaking analysis 
and interpretation to sort aspects of each attack into sets that will facilitate trend analysis. 
The MTI database also includes attacks identified through open source searches, as well 
as attacks that are not captured in other lists. It seeks to include all attacks starting in 1970; 
its record of attempted train derailments goes back to 1920, and its most recent entry was 
an attempted bombing of a train station on February 12, 2010, in West Bengal, India.
Figure 1 summarizes the number and types of attacks in the database as of February 
20, 2010. All attacks include terrorist attacks and serious crimes involving all methods, 
from arson and robbery to rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) to grenades, mines, and 
unspecified improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to bomb attacks (attacks using only 
explosive or incendiary devices) against all public transportation targets. Attacks against 
public train, public bus, and public highway and road transportation targets are also 
considered separately. The time period covered is from 1970 to the present. The 181 
derailment attacks in the database have been used to support a study on attempted 
derailments, particularly those relevant to high-speed rail transportation.3
The term “public” is important. The database does not include assassinations of individuals 
on trains, buses, or roads or attacks against private automobiles. The attacks recorded 
are those against assets created for use by the public, i.e., licensed trains or buses or 
constructed roads, bridges, and tunnels.4 
Figure 2 lists the sources MTI has and will use, along with continuing data-collection 
efforts. 
Since the database was first briefed on July 14, 2009, about 75 attacks have been added per 
month (Figure 3). Most of these additions came from concentrated searches of campaigns 
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against transportation targets in Israel, Russia, Turkey, India, Pakistan, Colombia, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, as well as the detailed review of various lists. MTI 
also gleans from two to four attacks a week from open sources. It is also examining the 
entries in the RAND Corporation chronology and will incorporate about 500 of those into 
the database.5 
Figure 1
Figure 2
Current Data
• MTI database includes, as of February 20, 2010   
– 1,633 attacks on all public surface transport, of which 1211 
(74%) were explosive or incendiary attacks
– 522 attacks against passenger trains/stations/tracks of which 
434 (83%) were explosive or incendiary attacks
• Of these there were 181 attempts to derail trains with bombs or 
mechanical sabotage
– 786 attacks against buses, of which 495 (63%) were explosives 
or incendiary attacks   
– 161 attacks against highway infrastructure targets, of which 82 
(50%) were explosives or incendiary attacks
• Time: 
– All attacks:  January 1970 to present
– 15 attacks between 1920 and 1970, of which 11 were  
derailments  
MTI Database (cont.)
• Numerous sources used
– 1920-2000: MTI chronologies 
– 1998-2007: UMSTART accounts with narratives
– 1998-2005: MIPT train attacks published by PT-ISAC
– 1980-2005: Public FTA/TSA chronology of mass transit attacks
• Current efforts at data collection
– RAND database of about 1,700 attacks since 1970 being carefully 
examined to add and reconcile entries. We expect about 500 new 
attacks to be added.
– Open sources updated daily – adding an average of 2 to 3 attacks a 
week.
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Figure 3
MTI is currently making the database more robust. It is working with explosives experts within and 
outside the government to increase and share information to enable better analyses of the 
effects of IEDs and improvised incendiary devices (IIDs). It is also testing the feasibility of 
adding new fields to a smaller set of data—including the data that will be used in the final 
MTI report on this topic. Those fields will require access to original data. 
Finally, MTI is moving the database from its current Excel© platform to a platform that 
enables median calculations as well as mean (average) calculations to be conducted, to 
provide a truer picture of both the likelihood and the lethality of different kinds of attacks. 
Figures 4 and 5 list some of the current fields in the system. They include 37 categories of 
targets and 26 categories of attacks and weapons, eight of which are considered “bombs 
or incendiaries.” The database also has 16 categories of methods of delivering and 
concealing devices and six categories of outcome, e.g., whether the devices detonated on 
target and on time, malfunctioned, or were rendered safe.
New fields being tested for inclusion on entries of recent attacks, for which more detailed 
information is available, are listed in Figure 6.
As Figure 7 indicates, MTI is creating a unique resource. Current lists of terrorist attacks 
have inaccuracies or are not focused on transportation. With the addition of new entries 
from the RAND Corporation, the MTI database will contain more than 2,000 attacks. 
Consultations with officials in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel have 
reinforced our belief that we are creating a unique resource for government officials and 
transportation operators.
Accomplishments and Improvements
• Attacks added:
– MTI first briefed DHS in July 2009; we had 1,049 attacks
– MTI’s data base now has 1,648 attacks
– MTI is adding attacks at the rate of about 75 a month by culling other sources
– MTI is adding about 2 to 3 attacks a week by searching open sources
• Current analysis:  MTI has used data base to perform trend analysis for 
– Bus Security awareness training (interim bus report already published)
– Counter-IED analysis for DHS 
– Derailment report already published
• New initiatives:
– Reconciling data with RAND – yielding many attacks to be added, which will 
increase comprehensiveness and accuracy
– Now moving to more stable and robust platform that will, among other things, 
allow for median calculations to give more accurate picture of lethality
– Exploring information exchange with professional explosives community within 
and outside US government
– Exploring adding new data fields to current data fields (see next three slides) 
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Figure 4
Figure 5
Some Current Fields
Targets (37 types):
• Bus (scheduled, school,  
tourist, government)
• Train (inter-city and commuter 
passenger, subway, trolley, 
elevated, government, tourist)
• Train infrastructure:  track, 
bridge, tunnel, 
communications
• Stations (enclosed, open air) 
and bus stops
• Vehicle highway, road, bridge, 
tunnel
Weapon and Attack (26 types): 
• IED & IID
• VBIED
• Assault automatic weapons
• Assault with RPG
• Arson
• Sabotage by derailing, or other 
sabotage
• Robbery, armed hijacking and 
kidnapping
Some Current Fields for Explosives
Explosives (8 types)
• IED–unspecified
• Mines & Claymore mines
• Dynamite
• grenades
• VBIEDS
• IIDs
• Other
Location
• Above or under ground
• In enclosed or open area
Outcome (5 types)
• Detonated or released on target
• Malfunctioned, detonated, released 
early or away from target
• Failed to detonate or release
• Detonated during unsuccessful 
EOD
• Rendered safe
Delivery and Concealment (16 types)
• On person (suicide)
• Left in bag or parcel in train or bus
• Left in station or bus stop
• Left outside station or bus stop
• Left in passenger compartment of train 
or bus
• Left in non-passenger compartment of 
train or bus
• Placed on tracks or near trains
• Placed near buses
• Physically thrown
• Other
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute Nat ional  Transportat ion Secur i ty Center of  Excel lence
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Figure 6
Figure 7
Some Future Data Fields 
• When attacks take place (peak versus off-peak)
• Size of cities in which attacks take place
• Type of train or bus, and type of service, and any other data on
environment in which bombs detonate
• IED details: type and size of charge, type of detonator and timer 
• Success in detecting attack/device:
– Intelligence
– Security personnel
– Employees
– Passengers
– Canines 
– Technology 
• Security measures before and after attack
• NOTE:  Because accurate information is difficult to get, focus will be 
on more recent attacks and attacks in countries with more reliable 
public reporting.
MTI Is Creating a Unique Resource
• Data exist on all terrorist attacks for periods of time (UMSTART and 
RAND); transportation details have to painstakingly culled out of 
data.
• Data exist on terrorist attacks against transportation for limited 
periods of time (MIPT and FTA/TSA list), but there are some 
inaccuracies.
• Consultations in the U.S. and abroad confirm that there is no known 
comprehensive list of accurate data that allows for empirical analysis 
of terrorist attacks against public surface transportation.
• With a database that will soon contain over 2,000 attacks and is
refreshed daily, MTI is creating a unique resource for governments 
and transportation operators. 
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COMPARISON OF ThE MTI DATABASE AND UMSTART
The MTI database does not compete with UMSTART; rather, it complements UMSTART. 
MTI’s database is designed to allow for updated trend analysis of attacks on public 
surface transportation. UMSTART allows more-general analyses to be performed. The 
MTI database therefore serves a purpose that UMSTART does not provide because of its 
broad mandate and design.
Roughly 37 percent of the 1,633 attacks currently in the MTI database were obtained from 
UMSTART (which is credited as the source of the data). MTI also uses UMSTART’s list of countries 
and regions, and for incidents for which it is the sole source, its information on fatalities, injuries, 
and perpetrators. Both UMSTART and the MTI database indicate whether attacks involve suicide 
and also provide other useful information. Most of the remaining 63 percent of the attacks come 
from MTI’s own published chronologies, a few come from the National Memorial Institute for the 
Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), many come from focused scans of open sources on particular 
campaigns, and an increasing number come from daily scans of news reports, a number that will 
inevitably grow. 
But there are important differences. 
First, MTI’s database contains more early attacks against surface transportation and is continually 
being updated, whereas UMSTART’s published data currently extend only to December 31, 
2007.
Second, there are significant differences in the level of aggregation. UMSTART aggregates 
transportation attacks into two categories: transportation and aviation (airports and airlines). At 
the data analysis level, it does not distinguish between attacks against public buses, public trains, 
subway trains, and their stations and stops, or between highways, bridges, and tunnels. It also 
does not distinguish between attacks against public transportation and attacks against private 
citizens, or it does so inconsistently. Searching UMSTART for attacks against transportation 
will not capture all of those aimed at public surface transportation, nor will it allow the user to 
differentiate between train, bus, and road attacks. By contrast, MTI’s database includes only 
attacks against public surface transport, and it differentiates between different types of public 
surface transportation targets. It therefore enables reliable data analysis on all terrorist attacks 
against public surface transport and against subsectors within it.
Third, UMSTART’s data structure for targets and attacks is much less detailed than that in the MTI 
database. While UMSTART’s data elements for targets relevant to public surface transportation 
are limited to “transportation,” MTI divides its targets into 37 categories. UMSTART codes attacks 
into nine categories, whereas MTI codes them into 26 categories, including eight categories for 
further analysis of attacks using explosives or incendiaries. Again, this allows for detailed analysis 
of the frequency and lethality of attacks against various subtargets.
Fourth, UMSTART provides only generic descriptions of the bombs used in attacks, placing them 
in a single category, “explosives/bombs/dynamite.” In contrast, MTI lists the number of devices 
used in an attack and indicates whether the detonation took place above or below ground; more 
important, it provides subcategories for number of devices, type of explosive or incendiary (eight 
subcategories), how it was delivered or concealed (sixteen subcategories), and the outcome of 
each device (seven subcategories). This allows MTI to provide critical analyses of the frequency 
and lethality of different combinations of bombs and incendiaries, delivered and concealed in 
different ways, against different targets. It also enables analysis of the frequency of use of single 
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versus multiple devices, and how frequently they detonated on target, malfunctioned, or were 
rendered safe through Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). 
Finally, the MTI database allows for separate analysis of train derailment attacks, coding them 
into instances in which it is known or suspected that bombs were placed on the tracks, or known 
or suspected that bolts or tracks were removed, or other methods were used. As of February 20, 
2010, MTI’s database contained 181 derailment events going back to 1920, captured separately 
and analyzed. 
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LIMITATIONS AND RELEVANCE OF ThE DATA TO U.S. 
PUBLIC SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
This section presents data on the frequency and lethality with which trains, buses, and 
road and highway targets are attacked. It is important to understand the preliminary nature 
of these data and also to place the attacks in context for U.S. stakeholders. 
DATA LIMITATIONS AND PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
Information on some of the attacks in the database is limited, and much of it is unreliable. 
This is true for attacks that took place decades ago or as recently as 10 years ago. It is 
also true for some attacks that take place in developing countries or in countries without 
a tradition of open reporting by government agencies. Also, regardless of where attacks 
or attempted attacks take place, if they occur during a news cycle dominated by other 
events, the amount of information available from open sources can be surprisingly limited. 
Finally, some reporting by local press may be speculative, unverified, or editorial, and 
the cooperative exchange of information on surface transportation attacks between 
governmental authorities—relative to that in the world of commercial aviation—appears to 
be only in its beginning stages.
For all these reasons, the MTI database entries assume certain default characteristics 
until more data are collected and verified. These “default entries” are recorded as rules in 
the database. For example: 
• The default entry for a bomb that explodes inside a bus is “concealed or placed 
in the passenger compartment.” This is a reasonable assumption, but in many 
cases there are insufficient data to verify that this was actually the case. Similar 
default entries are made for bombs that explode in bus stations and at bus stops: 
“concealed/left in stations (trash bins, under benches, near trains or buses)” and 
“concealed/left at bus stop.”
• The default entry for bombs or incendiary devices that detonate is “detonated or 
released on target.” This probably overstates, to some degree, the success of the 
attacks, particularly when casualties appear to be low, and it assumes precise 
knowledge of what the target was.
• Armed assault is considered to be “assault with automatic weapons,” since in the 
absence of information to the contrary, the prevalence of these weapons makes it 
likely that they were used.
• “IED–unspecified” describes any bomb for which there is no information detailing 
how it was constructed; and until more information is available on whether the 
targeted station was enclosed or open, it is similarly categorized as “bus (or train) 
station–unspecified.”
Some default entries are fairly reliable. The method of delivery and concealment of weapons 
used in suicide attacks is coded as “carried on person,” and a grenade is assumed (with 
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good reason, given the 4 seconds between the pulling of a pin and detonation) to be 
“physically thrown,” unless there is information indicating that it was combined with other 
mechanisms as an IED.
Another important limitation of the database derives from the inability of the current data 
system to perform routine median calculations. Some of the averages (means) are actually 
based on only two or three attacks, and in one case, only one attack. To put these figures 
into context, we have included the actual numbers of attacks on nearly all charts that 
provide average lethality, and some basic information is provided to explain these events. 
In cases where there are few attacks and the lethality or the success of the attacks is 
particularly high, the average should therefore be seen as what terrorists were able to 
accomplish in a particular incident, not what they usually accomplish. 
MTI researchers will continue to capture attacks individually, and existing lists of data will 
be discovered and searched. Questions about certain attacks will be answered, corrections 
will be made, and MTI’s new data platform will allow more powerful analyses. The results 
of our analyses of these attacks—unique as they are—must be seen as preliminary. They 
answer some long-standing questions, but they raise many others. 
Nevertheless, they serve an important purpose. They can help stakeholders—governments, 
transit managers, and employees—particularly in the United States, to focus on the ways 
the most frequent and/or most lethal attacks are carried out as they consider measures to 
prevent or mitigate attacks that may be considered likely to happen in the United States.
RELEVANCE TO ThE UNITED STATES OF ATTACKS ON  
TRANSPORTATION IN OThER COUNTRIES
Only 15 of the attacks in the MTI database occurred in North America (i.e., the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico):
1. Three attacks on or threats to road infrastructure. A 1984 threat to bomb the 
Sarasota-Bradenton Bridge in Florida; a 1977 explosion on the Route 1 bridge in 
Florida Homestead and Key West; and liquid explosives found underneath the 
Golden Gate Bridge in 1982. 
2. Four bus attacks. One assault and one robbery on buses in Mexico; a 1989 
Greyhound bus hijacking which was resolved peacefully; and a 2010 criminal 
hijacking in Edmonton, Canada. 
3. Eight train attacks or threats. A 1980 bomb blast in New York’s Penn Station; the 
1984 detonation of a bomb in the Montreal train station; a 1993 bomb explosion 
in a train station in Guadalajara; two December 1994 detonations of an incendiary 
device in the New York subway system by a disgruntled individual; a 1995 Amtrak 
derailment in Arizona; a grenade found in a train station in 1982 in Chicago; and a 
2009 detonation of a device in a rail signal bungalow in Sugar Grove, Illinois. 
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All of these were isolated events, and only three were conducted by or specifically 
associated with an organized group: the Amtrak derailment (Sons of Gestapo), the 1984 
bomb threat to the bridge in Florida (Luis Boitel Commandos), and the 1980 Penn Station 
bombing (Puerto Rican Armed Resistance (RAP)). None involved jihadist terrorists.
The overwhelming majority of the attacks against public surface transportation took place 
outside the United States. It is important to understand the context of many of the attacks, 
because while they are important, some have limited relevance to the domestic U.S. 
environment. 
Most of the attacks have been part of essentially local guerrilla or terrorist campaigns 
designed to bring down a government or achieve independence, autonomy, separation, 
and/or some kind of state governing the territory for which this independence, autonomy, 
or separation is sought. Public transportation has been routinely targeted by Hamas, 
Hizballah, Islamic Jihad, and the robust collection of groups seeking a Palestinian state 
or the destruction of Israel; Sikh and Islamic separatists in India; the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, also known as the Tamil Tigers; the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the New People’s Army in Colombia; and the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MLF) in the Philippines. Yet the ideologies of these groups range 
from Islamism to Marxism, and the groups themselves can be religious (e.g., Hizballah 
and Hamas) or secular (e.g., LTTE and FARC).
Most of the attacks take place in countries in which train or bus transportation is either 
the primary means of public transportation (e.g., in Israel) or, along with trains, a large 
part of it, and in rural areas, the only public transportation. This is far from the situation 
in the United States, where aviation is the primary method of long-haul transportation, 
and with the exception of high-density urban centers such as New York, Boston, and San 
Francisco, the automobile is the primary method of local transportation. Where train or bus 
transportation is extremely important, it becomes an obvious terrorist target. Conversely, 
where it is not so important, it may be a less likely target.
Many of the tactics used in these attacks—some particularly lethal—are unlikely to be 
used in the United States. For example, Claymore mines were used exclusively in Sri 
Lanka and with particular effectiveness, and land mines have been used in rural areas of 
Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Southwest Asia. These weapons most likely become 
available to terrorist groups that are linked with active insurgencies, obtain military training, 
and have access to military equipment. In the United States, where military equipment is 
controlled but automatic weapons, including assault rifles, are widely available, it seems 
unlikely that military weapons would be used. 
Finally, in the United States, actual terrorist acts are so far dominated not by Islamic or 
Middle Eastern groups, but by groups or individuals energized by specific domestic issues. 
The terrorist attacks in the United States for the 10 years in which narrative descriptions 
are provided in UMSTART (January 1, 1997, to December 31, 2007) illustrate this point 
(Figure 8). 
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Figure 8
With the exception of the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001—which were conceived and 
orchestrated from outside the United States—U.S. “domestic terrorism” during this period 
has not been particularly successful. Although jihadist plots certainly have been aimed 
at producing high body counts, the 143 remaining attacks resulted in only 11 deaths and 
51 injuries. Also, although those plots included public transportation targets—specifically, 
the heavy rail urban mass transportation systems of major U.S. cities—no attacks against 
public transportation targets were recorded.6 Further, only one of the attacks could be 
considered “Middle Eastern.” It was conducted by a 70-year-old Palestinian male whose 
writings reveal a set of grievances that included not only Israel, but individuals who had 
cheated him out of funds and tourists in the Empire State Building. 
The greatest percentage of attacks (43 percent) involved extremist anti-abortion groups 
and individuals; 25 percent were conducted by the Earth Liberation Front and similar 
groups; and 16 percent were conducted by the Animal Liberation Front. One attack 
was conducted by the Ku Klux Klan and a similar group, the Republic of Texas, and 
a smattering of single attacks were conducted by individuals or groups, most of them 
against government or corporate institutions for one cause or another. Finally, a large 
percentage of the attacks (16 percent) were conducted by unknown persons. 
Indeed, non-jihadist U.S. domestic terrorist groups have shown little inclination to cause 
civilian casualties, and most, in fact, have attempted to avoid them. This point is illustrated 
by Figures 9 and 10, taken from a recent MTI report.7 Even the devastating 1995 Oklahoma 
City attack by Timothy McVeigh was aimed primarily at the U.S. government; McVeigh 
considered innocent civilians to be acceptable collateral damage.
10 Years of Terrorist Attacks in the 
United States
• Data taken from UMSTART:  1/1/97 to 12/31/07
• 147 attacks, including the four 9/11 attacks; of the 143 remaining attacks
• Lethality limited: 11 deaths and 51 injuries
• No public transportation targets 
• Only one attack attributed to “Palestinians”: February 23, 1997, attack on 
tourists at the Empire State building:  1 death, 6 injuries.
• The attacks break down roughly as:
– 43% against abortion institutions by individuals or extreme anti-abortion 
groups
– 25% against institutions by the Earth Liberation Front 
– 16% against institutions by the Animal Liberation Front
– 16% against businesses and other targets by unknown individuals
– 1 attack by KKK and 1 by the Republic of Texas
– Single attacks against institutions by other non-jihhadist groups and 
individuals
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Figure 9
Figure 10
Nevertheless, many attacks that take place in other countries are relevant to the United 
States and to public transportation, for several reasons.
From Potential Terrorist Uses of Highway-Borne 
Hazardous Materials (MTI Report #09-03)
• Other (non-jihadist) sources of terrorist attacks in the United 
States range from the Animal Liberation Front and violent 
environmental activists to right-wing extremists and white 
supremacists. For these groups, the priority of targets is 
primarily dictated by the specific objective of the attack, 
because these groups are motivated by narrowly defined 
issues.  
• While the Oklahoma City bombing resulted in a significant 
number of casualties, it is important to realize that in the mind 
of the bomber, Timothy McVeigh, the objective was to destroy 
a federal government building with government employees, 
not civilian bystanders.
From Potential Terrorist Uses of Highway-Borne 
Hazardous Materials (MTI Report #09-03) (cont.)
• It is difficult to define precisely the ranking of targets for such a large range 
of groups.  However, certain trends do emerge.  Declarations, plots, and 
actions show that these attackers tend to:
– Focus on targets (individuals, infrastructure, or buildings) that are 
specifically associated, as part of the government or as part of a 
company, with the specific policies or entity being targeted. Two 
examples are the bombings of IRS offices and the assaults on 
laboratories or individuals engaged in animal research.  
– Focus on controlling economic damage and on limiting collateral 
casualties.  For example, recent environmental fires set in housing 
developments by environmental extremists specifically excluded 
occupied buildings.  Attacks on animal testing labs have similarly 
avoided human casualties, although some animal-rights extremists have 
targeted individuals.
– Make no mention of transportation.
– Almost never target bystanders, either in open-air public 
gatherings or inside residential or other public buildings.  
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First, successful attacks against any target can be imitated. Terrorists seeking to attack 
public surface transportation have an extensive playbook of attacks against such targets. 
The description of successful results, particularly against very soft targets, simplifies the 
task for any terrorist seeking to make a similar attack and shortens the planning cycle. 
Attacks in London, Madrid, and Mumbai were considered major terrorist successes. Past 
success makes future attempts more likely.
Second, public transportation, particularly train transportation, fits the profile of a desirable 
terrorist target. As described in the following excepts from a recent MTI report,8 terrorists 
are opportunists and are far more likely to attempt attacks that will, with high confidence, 
achieve a death toll of 25 to 50 than a risky, complicated operation that could kill 1,000 or 
more.
Forced to choose between undertaking a complex and demanding operation to 
cause massive death and destruction and executing a smaller-scale attack with 
certainty of success, terrorists seem generally to choose the latter. Terrorists may 
be willing to sacrifice their lives; they are far less willing to risk operational failure.
* * * *
Operational success tends to be defined in terms of casualties. Terrorists seek 
targets that have emotional or symbolic value—widely recognizable icons, targets 
whose destruction would significantly damage or disrupt the economy, and high 
body counts. In recent attacks, terrorists have been willing to forgo iconic value in 
favor of high body counts, for example, by bombing subways or commuter trains. 
The economic impact of such attacks is indirect.
* * * *
The following assessment from the same report indicates the likelihood of al Qaeda or 
other jihadist groups targeting public transportation:
The threat posed by al Qaeda and groups associated with it is somewhat easier 
to analyze than that of other groups because al Qaeda’s declarations, plots, and 
attacks are fairly consistent and suggest a distinct prioritization of targets.
Al Qaeda urges its followers to carry out attacks that will produce high body counts 
and will have symbolic value—in jihadist language, attacks on targets that have 
“emotional” value (iconic targets)—and attacks that will cause serious economic 
damage. The iconic component can refer either to the destruction of an internationally 
recognized icon or to an iconic venue. In the latter case, the destruction of the 
target would not necessarily be the goal. The venue would merely be a dramatic 
backdrop that would increase the psychological impact of the attack.
In fact, however, few of the jihadist attacks and plots since 9/11 have included iconic 
targets or venues, although diplomatic facilities and even nightclubs the jihadists 
consider sinful do have symbolic content. And despite the continued drumbeat 
about economic warfare in al Qaeda communications, the economic impact of the 
terrorist attacks since 9/11 has been incidental—for example, attacks on hotels do 
adversely impact tourism. 
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Almost all of the jihadist attacks since 9/11 have been directed against soft targets—
that is, unprotected or lightly protected targets such as hotels (Indonesia, Kenya, 
Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan), restaurants and nightclubs (Indonesia, Morocco, United 
Kingdom), public surface transportation (Spain, United Kingdom, Philippines, 
India), residential compounds (Saudi Arabia), and high-profile individuals. Terrorist 
attacks on embassies, consulates, and commercial buildings (Indonesia, Pakistan, 
and Turkey) have used vehicle bombs on the street; in other words, they have 
not attempted to penetrate security. Only in a couple of instances have terrorists 
attacked government buildings or, in one case, a refinery (Saudi Arabia), which are 
likely to have higher levels of security. This again suggests a low tolerance for risk of 
failure. The detonation of the terrorist devices, even beyond any security perimeter, 
still resulted in casualties and destruction. The avoidance of security does not mean 
that the terrorists were averse to personal risk, since many of these were suicide 
attacks. We are talking about operational risks.
A review of the terrorist plots that were uncovered during the same period reveals 
greater operational ambition (use of exotic substances, multipart operations) to attack 
more-diverse but still similar targets. Most of the plots involved attacks on public 
surface transportation—the killing fields of terrorists bent upon slaughter. 
Embassies figured in several plots, along with other government buildings and 
military headquarters. Several plots involved attacks on naval or civilian vessels, 
like the attacks on the USS Cole or the French supertanker Limburg. However, soft 
targets predominate. (emphasis added)
Third, until very recently, radical jihadist plots involving attacks inside the United States 
have been fairly amateurish, but four of them have focused on public transportation. All four 
targeted heavy rail mass transit systems of major U.S. cities; none involved bus targets. 
The 1997 Flatbush plot•	 . In this plot, a suicide vest was prepared for use against the New 
York subway system. One conspirator hesitated, however, and approached the transit police. 
Authorities in turn conducted a raid and foiled the plot before it could be implemented. 
The 2003 New York poison gas plot•	 . In February 2003, a cell of terrorists were arrested 
on their way to Bahrain from Saudi Arabia. They had designed devices to be placed near 
air intakes in ventilation systems or in closed areas and had undertaken surveillance of the 
New York subway system in fall 2002. They requested permission from al Qaeda’s central 
leadership, but the decision was made to cancel the operation because the leadership had 
“something better in mind.” It is unclear what was meant by that comment. 
The 2004 herald Square plot.•	  In August 2004, two individuals, one born in the United 
States and the other a naturalized U.S. citizen, conspired to place a bomb in the Garden 
City subway station in New York City. Other targets in New York, particularly surface 
transportation targets, were discussed as well. A tip to the New York Police Department 
(NYPD) from an anonymous caller led the NYPD to pay an informant to work his way 
into the Islamic community (including mosques and book stores) to secure information 
about the plans of the conspirators. The informant taped conversations and provided key 
evidence. The NYPD also used an undercover officer and ended the plot before it could 
be put into operation. While the intelligence and emotional stability of the conspirators are 
questionable, the plot definitely included surveillance and operational planning. 
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The 2006 PATh Tunnels plot•	 . In July 2006, FBI online surveillance uncovered a plot 
involving eight suspects, one of them (Assem Hammoud) an al Qaeda loyalist living in 
Lebanon, to blow up New York City PATH tunnels. Hammoud was released on bail after 
serving 26 months in solitary confinement in Lebanon. Two other individuals were also 
arrested, one in Canada and the other in the United Kingdom. According to the FBI, the 
plan was to carry bombs on backpacks onto commuter trains and detonate them while 
moving through tunnels. Dates and the amounts of explosives were discussed, and 
financing was apparently secured. The plot was uncovered before an overseas operative 
could go to the United States to undertake serious operational planning. The conspirators 
also spoke of bombing New York subways, among other targets. 
In addition, Bryant Neal Vinas, a U.S. citizen raised on Long Island who was captured by 
Pakistani authorities for taking part in al Qaeda operations in Pakistan, passed information 
to al Qaeda about the Long Island Rail Road system.
Fourth, the level of determination and sophistication of the plots, although still low in 
comparison with those originating and or conducted outside the United States, seems to 
be increasing, as illustrated by the recent Zazi plot, in which Najibullah Zazi pleaded guilty 
to planning to detonate bombs in the New York City subways; co-conspirators have also 
been charged.
Finally, while the pace of radical and violent jihadist radicalization has been slower in 
the United States than in other countries such as the United Kingdom and France, the 
cases of domestic radicalization and recruitment to jihadist terrorism and the plots that 
are sometimes involved appear to be increasing. Between September 12, 2001, and the 
end of 2009, 44 cases of domestic radicalization and recruitment to jihadist terrorism 
were reported in the United States. Thirty-two cases took place between 2002 and 2008, 
an average of four a year. But in 2009 there were 12 cases, a considerable increase.9 
As Secretary of DHS Janet Napolitano recently told Congress, “Home-based terrorism is 
here…. And like violent extremism abroad, it is now part of the threat picture that we must 
confront.” Since public transportation is in the terrorist playbook and has yielded many 
successes, possible attacks against the public transportation system in the United States 
must be considered. 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute Nat ional  Transportat ion Secur i ty Center of  Excel lence
19
TRENDS IN ATTACKS ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
ATTACKS AgAINST ALL SURFACE TRANSPORTATION TARgETS
Fatalities and Injuries
Figures 11, 12, and 13 illustrate several fundamental points. Figure 11 demonstrates that 
while public surface transportation has been around for about 150 years, terrorist attacks 
against it have been a relatively recent phenomenon. MTI has recorded 15 attacks against 
surface transportation that occurred between 1920 and 1970, almost all of which were 
train bombings or attempted train derailments. Terrorist attacks started in earnest in about 
1970 and then accelerated in the 1990s and the current decade. The apparent drop in 
attacks in the past several years, as shown in Figures 12 and 13, is not an indication that 
the tempo of attacks has dropped, but rather reflects a lag in official reporting.
Figures 12 and 13 illustrate the relationship between fatalities and attacks against surface 
transportation targets and injuries and attacks against those targets, respectively. The 
spikes in attacks correspond relatively well to the spikes in fatalities and injuries. More 
attention should be paid to fatalities than to injuries, however, for several reasons. Reporting 
on fatalities is generally more accurate than reporting on injuries; open source reports often 
provide a firm number of fatalities and “at least” a certain number of persons injured. The 
minimum number is recorded in the MTI database. In some cases, the account defines 
injuries as “several” or “many”; until an estimate is obtained, these are given the value 
of zero.10 Also, some injuries later become deaths. Finally, different countries may use 
different definitions of serious injuries and may record only those or all injuries. The bottom 
line is that death is easier to define.
Figure 11
Surface Transportation Attacks: A Relatively 
Recent Problem
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Figure 12
 
Figure 13
As shown in Figure 14, attacks on public surface transportation are usually and increasingly 
designed to kill, and major attacks provide a very good return on investment for the terrorist. 
While 62 percent of the attacks result in no casualties, the attacks are usually poorly 
executed or stopped and in some instances are designed to achieve economic disruption. 
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Figure 14
Nine percent of the attacks yielded more than 10 deaths, on average. Major attacks against 
trains, such as those in Moscow, Israel, Mumbai, London, and Madrid, resulted in as many 
as 50 or more fatalities. The bottom line is that public surface transportation targets are 
generally easy to hit and lucrative. They, along with hotels and public assemblies, are 
killing fields for terrorists. 
Suicide Bombers
Figure 15 presents the results of attacks on public transportation by suicide bombers, 
which are foremost in the minds of those concerned with security. Suicide bombers strike 
particular fear into officials and populations of countries that have been hit by or are 
likely targets of such attacks, and for good reason: Suicide bombing signals a level of 
commitment and hatred well beyond that which countries normally experience, and the 
suicide bomber has the unique advantage of guiding the bomb to its destination. However, 
although this method of delivering a weapon is particularly lethal for bus targets, it is less 
lethal for train targets. Moreover, suicide bombers and bombs are generally not the most 
lethal combination of attack and weapon. In most terrorist campaigns, it is far easier and 
therefore more common to attack targets and deliver bombs in other ways. And particularly 
for open targets, other methods produce good results for the terrorists.
As Figure 15 shows, only 4.96 percent of all attacks and 6.69 percent of bomb attacks 
were suicide operations, but they caused more than twice their proportionate share of 
fatalities (9.76 percent and 15.11 percent). They represent a much higher percentage of 
attacks against buses (12.32 percent) than of attacks against train targets (4.14 percent). 
The figures for bus targets are based largely on suicide bombings against buses in Israel, 
Sri Lanka, and South Asia. Suicide bombings against subways in London in 2005 and 
Body Counts “Count”
• Terrorists seek slaughter; attacks with body counts of 50 to 
100 considered good returns on investment
• Substantial percentage of all attacks against surface transport 
designed to kill, not to cause economic harm:
– 38% of attacks resulted in at least 1 death
– 17% of attacks resulted in at least 5 deaths
– 9% of attacks resulted in at least 10 deaths
• Majority of recent attacks appear intended to kill
– Most of remaining 62% of attacks 
• Failed or were stopped, or
• Aimed at disruption (often in areas of insurgency), especially 
against road targets (e.g., FARC and also IRA campaigns 
against tracks and roads)
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute Nat ional  Transportat ion Secur i ty Center of  Excel lence
Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation22
passenger trains and subway stations in Moscow were also significant events.
Figure 15
Distribution and Lethality by Region and Country
Figures 16 and 17 show the regions in which most attacks take place and in which they 
are most lethal. Figure 16 provides these data for all 1,633 attacks in the database, and 
Figure 17 provides them for the 1,211 bomb attacks. 
Figure 16
What About Suicide Bombers?
All attacks # % of Total Fatalities % of Total Injuries % of Total
# of suicides 81 602 3068
# of all attacks 1633 4.96% 6167 9.76% 19241 15.95%
# of bomb attacks 1211 6.69% 3984 15.11% 16466 18.63%
Train attacks # % of Total Fatalities % of Total Injuries % of Total
# of suicides 18 106 904
# of train attacks 522 3.45% 2883 3.66% 10464 8.64%
#  of train bomb attacks 434 4.14% 1858 5.71% 8957 10.09%
Buses # % of Total Fatalities % of Total Injuries % of Total
# of suicides 61 448 2144
# of bus attacks 786 7.76% 3011 14.88% 8197 26.16%
# of bus bomb attacks 495 12.32% 1902 23.55% 7025 30.52%
All Attacks: Regional Distribution and Lethality 
per Attack
Region # % of Total FPA IPA
South Asia 516 31.60% 5.0 16.1
Middle East and North Africa 310 18.98% 3.2 11.3
Western Europe 218 13.35% 1.8 15.3
Southeast Asia 156 9.55% 2.7 7.6
Russia and the NIS 137 8.39% 2.4 9.1
South America 112 6.86% 1.4 2.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 83 5.08% 10.2 10.1
Eastern Europe 33 2.02% 0.7 3.2
East Asia 31 1.90% 11.9 11.6
Central America & Caribbean 15 0.92% 1.1 2.1
North America 15 0.92% 0.2 2.1
Australasia & Oceania 4 0.24% 0 0.8
Central Asia 3 0.18% 0 0.7
Total 1,633 100.00% 3.8 11.8
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Figure 17
The largest percentage of all attacks have taken place in South Asia, followed by the 
Middle East and North Africa. Western Europe, Southeast Asia, Russia, and the Newly 
Independent States (NIS) also experienced a high percentage of attacks, followed by South 
America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Relatively few attacks occurred in Eastern Europe, East 
Asia, Central America, and the Caribbean, and only Australasia and Oceania and Central 
Asia had fewer attacks than North America. 
When only bomb attacks are considered, there are relatively few shifts in regional 
distribution. The top three regions remain the same; Russia and the NIS have more attacks 
than Southeast Asia; and a few other regions switch places, but they do not involve a 
large number of attacks. North America ranks tenth among developed countries for all 
attacks and ninth for bomb attacks, but these rankings are very low in view of its large 
population. 
Lethality follows a somewhat different track. Largely because of a single 2003 case 
of arson in a subway in South Korea (which resulted in 198 deaths), East Asia 
has a the highest fatality rate (11.9 FPA). The next highest rate is in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (10.2 FPA), the result of particularly deadly attacks against passenger trains 
(the single most lethal attack in the entire database is an attack on a passenger 
train by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), in which 
a bomb and automatic weapons killed 259 people and injured 165). Except for 
these attacks, average lethality more closely follows distribution, with the highest 
FPA being in South Asia (5 FPA), followed by the Middle East and North Africa 
(3.2 FPA), Southeast Asia, (2.7 FPA), Russia and the NIS (2.4 FPA), and Western 
Europe (1.8 FPA), all of which are below average. The lethality of attacks in North 
America is exceedingly low (0.2 FPA and 2.1 IPA). The only region where a large 
All Bomb Attacks: Regional Distribution and 
Lethality per Attack
Region # % of Total FPD IPD
South Asia 433 35.7% 4.9 17.4
Middle East and North Africa 223 18.4% 2.6 13.4
Western Europe 173 14.4% 2.2 19.2
Russia and the NIS 117 9.7% 2.7 10.4
Southeast Asia 106 8.7% 1.6 6.1
South America 67 5.5% 0.7 2.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 30 2.5% 5.5 8.6
East Asia 25 2.0% 7.1 8.8
Eastern Europe 16 1.3% 0.9 4.6
North America 9 0.7% 0.3 3.8
Central America & Caribbean 5 0.4% 0 1.4
Australasia & Oceania 4 0.3% 0 0.8
Central Asia 3 0.2% 0 0.7
Total 1,211 100% 2.6 10.7
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number of attacks have occurred that has a higher-than-average FPA is South 
Asia. Even attacks in the Middle East and North Africa—which includes Israel—do 
not have higher-than-average lethality.
When only bomb attacks are considered, few differences are seen between regions. East 
Asia still leads at 7.1 FPD (even though the subway arson attack is excluded), followed by 
Sub-Saharan Africa (5.5 FPD). As with all attacks, South Asia is the region hit frequently 
in which the average FPD is highest (4.9 FPD), followed by Russia and the NIS (2.7 FPD), 
and only then by the Middle East and North Africa (2.6 FPD). All other regions, including 
Western Europe (2.2 FPD) fall below the average of 2.6 FPD. 
Figure 18 lists the ten developing and developed11 countries in which most attacks have 
occurred, and Figure 19 lists the top ten for bomb attacks. For all attacks, the distribution 
among leading countries yields no real surprises. The countries that received the bulk of 
the attacks are India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka in South Asia; the Philippines and Thailand 
in Southeast Asia; Israel, Turkey, Algeria, and Egypt in the Middle East and North Africa; 
Japan and China in East Asia; the United Kingdom, Spain, France, Germany, Italy, and 
Greece in Western Europe; Russia in Russia and the NIS; and the United States in North 
America. For bomb attacks, there are no real shifts of any significance, for the simple fact 
that bomb attacks constitute the majority of attacks.
The data on lethality for all attacks are somewhat surprising, probably because the 
international press generally reports only the major incidents. The average lethality for all 
attacks is 3.8 FPA, and the average injuries are 11.8 IPA. The countries that rise above 
this level are, in order, China at 9.5 FPA (reflecting a few serious bomb and bus attacks); 
Sri Lanka at 9.0 FPA (reflecting the intense and lethal campaign by LTTE); Italy at 7.9 FTA 
(again reflecting a few lethal train attacks); Algeria at 6.1 FPA (reflecting some execution-
style assaults on buses, including throat slittings); and India at 5.3 FPA (which includes 
All Attacks: Leading Countries – Distribution 
and Average Fatalities per Attack
Rank DevelopingCountry #
% of 
Total FPA IPA
Developed
Country #
% of 
Total FPA IPA
1 India 267 16.35% 5.3 17.6 Israel 156 9.55% 3.2 15.7
2 Pakistan 149 9.12% 3.8 9.9 Russia 115 7.04% 2.6 9.5
3 Philippines 85 5.21% 1.8 7.3 U.K. 78 4.78% 1.0 12.3
5 Colombia 71 4.35% 1.3 1.4 Spain 47 2.88% 3.8 38.3
6 Sri Lanka 57 3.49% 9.0 27.7 France 27 1.65% 0.7 6.8
4 Turkey 54 3.31% 1.9 6.9 germany 25 1.53% 0.1 0.9
7 Algeria 44 2.69% 6.1 9.5 Italy 14 0.86% 7.9 23.5
9 Thailand 42 2.57% 0.9 3.9 greece 10 0.61% 0.1 1.6
8 Egypt 34 2.08% 1.3 6.5 Japan 8 0.49% 0.1 0.3
10 China 18 1.10% 9.5 11.6 U.S. 7 0.43% 0 0.3
Figure 18
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the Mumbai attack and other very lethal incidents). Countries that were at or slightly below 
average lethality were Pakistan and Spain (reflecting the March 11, 2004, bombings) at 
3.8 FPA, followed by Israel at 3.2 FPA and Russia at 2.6 FPA, which reflects the continuing 
violence of Chechen separatists. Lethality for attacks in the United States is very low, 0 
FPA and 0.3 IPA. 
The lethality data for bomb attacks are similar. The average lethality for all attacks is 2.6 
FPD and 10.7 IPD, but more countries rise above the average than in the findings for all 
attacks. China’s average is 10.7 FTD, and Italy’s is 9.3 FPD; next comes Sri Lanka at 8.6 
FPD, Spain at 5.0 FPD (which reflects the Madrid attacks), India at 4.9 FPD, Pakistan at 
3.6 FPD, Israel at 3.4 FPD, Colombia at 3.3 FPD, Russia at 3.0 FPD, and Algeria at 2.7 
FPD. Lethality for the United States is again very low, 0 FPD and 0.7 IPD, a very slight rise 
over the averages for all attacks. 
Distribution and Lethality by Target group
Next we examine the frequency and lethality of attacks on bus, train, and road targets 
using all weapons and the comparable data for attacks using only explosive and incendiary 
devices. 
Figures 20 and 21 place the nine passenger train target subcategories into three groups: 
passenger trains, train stations, and train tracks. Passenger trains include trolleys, subway
trains, and intercity trains. Attacks on tracks are most often attempted derailments, and 
many, but not all, of these are aimed at passenger trains. The eight bus target subcategories 
are grouped into buses (including passenger bus, minivans, school buses, and tour buses), 
bus stations, and bus stops. 
Figure 19
Bomb Attacks: Leading Countries – Distribution and 
Average Fatalities per Attack
Rank Developing Country #
% of 
total FPD IPD
Developed 
Country #
% of 
total FPD IPD
1 India 222 18.32% 4.9 18.9 Israel 123 10.15% 3.4 17.9
2 Pakistan 130 10.73% 3.6 10.8 Russia 102 8.42% 3.0 10.6
3 Philippines 64 5.28% 1.8 8.5 U.K. 73 6.02% 0.9 13.1
4 Sri Lanka 50 4.13% 8.6 29.9 Spain 36 2.97% 5.0 50.1
5 Turkey 41 3.38% 1.0 7.7 France 20 1.65% 1.0 9.2
6 Colombia 40 3.30% 0.8 1.8 germany 12 0.99% 0.1 1.8
7 Algeria 29 2.39% 2.7 12.1 Italy 12 0.99% 9.3 27.4
8 Thailand 26 2.15% 0.9 3.8 greece 8 0.66% 0.1 2.0
9 China 16 1.32% 10.7 13.1 U.S. 6 0.50% 0 0.7
10 Egypt 16 1.32% 1.2 7.3 Japan 5 0.41% 0 0.2
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Figure 20
Figure 21
In the figures, the data on all attacks include all 26 categories of attacks, ranging from 
IEDs to sabotage by derailing to assault with automatic weapons to kidnapping. Data on 
bomb attacks include only the eight categories of explosive and incendiary devices.
All Attacks:  Distribution by Target Groups
Target group # Attacks % of Total
Buses 662 40.54%
Passenger trains 352 21.56%
Train stations 172 10.53%
Bus stations/stops 155 9.49%
Railway tracks 124 7.59%
Vehicle bridge or 
tunnel 57 3.49%
Freight train 45 2.76%
highway or road 31 1.90%
Bomb Attacks: Distribution by Target Groups
Target group # Attacks % of Total
Buses 372 30.72%
Passenger trains 277 22.87%
Train stations 158 13.05%
Bus stations/stops 146 12.06%
Railway tracks 106 8.75%
Vehicle bridge or 
tunnel 56 4.62%
Freight train 40 3.30%
highway or road 23 1.90%
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Combining all train and bus targets into a single group, we observe the following for all 
attacks: First, bus targets are involved in 50 percent of all attacks; passenger train targets 
are involved in roughly 40 percent, followed by track attacks (7.5 percent), many of which 
are aimed at passenger trains, and road attacks (mostly bridge attacks) at 5.4 percent. 
Second, we calculate lethality by attack for both all attacks and bomb attacks. Lethality 
is higher for passenger train attacks than for bus attacks. The average FPA and IPA for 
train targets are 5.4 FPA and 19.5 IPA, whereas the averages for bus targets are 3.8 
FPA and 10.4 IPA. Track attacks achieved only 0.9 FPA and 0.9 IPA, and road attacks 
resulted in almost no fatalities or injuries, as they are usually aimed primarily at destroying 
infrastructure, not at creating casualties. 
The corresponding observations for bomb attacks are as follows. First, bus targets still 
predominate, being involved in 42.7 percent of attacks, but the difference between the 
percentage of attacks on buses and the percentage on trains decreases from 10 percent 
to 6 percent, as the percentage of attacks directed at bus targets decreases from 50 
percent to 40 percent, and the percentage of attacks against trains decreases only from 
40 percent to 36 percent. Track attacks increase slightly, to 8.75 percent, and road attacks 
increase slightly, to 6.52 percent.
The difference in lethality between train and bus targets is less for bomb attacks than for all 
attacks. Average lethality for passenger train bomb attacks is 4.2 FPA and 16.4 IPA, less 
than for all attacks, while average lethality for bus targets increases to 3.9 FPA and 11.5 
IPA. Further, the lethality of track attacks decreases to 0.1 FPA and 0.5 IPA, reflecting the 
lethality of mechanical sabotage. Finally, the lethality of road fatalities increases somewhat, 
to 0.8 FPA and 0.5 IPA. This probably reflects the fact that some attacks using both IEDs 
and assault weapons take place on roads and are classified as road attacks.12 
Distribution and Lethality by Target Type
Figures 22 and 23 present data on the distribution and lethality of all attacks against various 
types of public surface transportation targets.
Attacks on scheduled buses and passenger trains dominate, followed by attacks on train 
and bus stations and railroad tracks, then on tourist buses and bus stops and vehicle 
bridge targets. Lethality of all attacks is greatest for subway train attacks, at 13.2 FPA, 
no doubt reflecting not only the attacks in London and Russia, but also the arson attack 
in South Korea (a non-bomb event). Lethality of attacks on passenger trains is 6.7 FPA. 
Next are scheduled passenger and company or government buses at 4.8 FPA, followed by 
trucks (rare but often deadly attacks, at 4.7 FPA). All other targets result in below-average 
lethality, with train stations at 3.3 FPA. 
The distribution and lethality of bomb attacks against all targets is shown in Figures 24 
and 25.
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Figure 22
Figure 23
Target Distribution and Average Lethality
for All 1,633 Attacks
Target # % of Total FPA IPA 
Bus, scheduled 516 31.60% 4.8 11.4
Passenger train 318 19.47% 6.7 24.5
Train station - unspecified 126 7.72% 3.3 12.1
Railway tracks 124 7.59% 0 0.4
Bus station - unspecified 110 6.74% 1.3 9.5
Bus, tourist 64 3.92% 2.3 4.3
Vehicle bridge 56 3.43% 0.3 0.4
Bus stop 45 2.76% 1.8 14.4
Train, freight 36 2.20% 0.7 1.9
Minivan or minibus 35 2.14% 3.5 5.7
highway or road 34 2.08% 0.9 1.1
Bus, company or gov't 31 1.90% 4.8 11.1
Train, subway 21 1.29% 13.2 38.7
Subway station - unspecified 20 1.22% 0.9 4.7
Target Distribution and Average Lethality 
for All 1,633 Attacks (cont.)
Target # % of Total FPA IPA
Railway bridge 17 1.04% 0 0
Bus, school 16 0.98% 2.4 9.7
Train station-enclosed building 13 0.80% 0.2 4.9
Truck 10 0.61% 4.7 3.3
Station - train and bus 8 0.49% 1.0 6.8
Other (not yet categorized) 7 0.43% 0 0.9
Train, trolley 6 0.37% 0 9.6
Train, tourist 5 0.31% 2.0 11.4
Subway station – enclosed 
building 5 0.31% 1.6 0
Railway signals or COM system 3 0.18% 0 0
Transportation company office 2 0.12% 0 0
Train, troop 2 0.12% 0 11.0
Vehicle tunnel 1 0.06% 0 0
Railway - unspecified 1 0.06% 0 0
Multiple targets 1 0.06% 0 0
Total 1,633 100.00% 3.8 11.8
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Figure 24
Figure 25
Target Distribution and Average Lethality 
for all 1,211 Bomb Attacks
Target # Attacks % of Total FPD IPD
Bus, scheduled 297 24.5% 5.3 16.8
Passenger trains 251 20.7% 5.3 25.9
Train station - unspecified 119 9.8% 3.3 12.5
Railway tracks 109 9.0% 0 0.3
Bus station - unspecified 106 8.7% 1.3 9.8
Vehicle bridge 56 4.6% 0.3 0.4
Bus stop 40 3.3% 2.0 15.7
Train, freight 35 2.9% 0.7 1.9
Bus, tourist 24 2.0% 0.9 4.3
highway or road 25 2.1% 0.9 0.9
Bus, company or gov't 23 1.9% 5.9 14.7
Train, subway 20 1.6% 4.0 33.3
Minivan or minibus 18 1.5% 2.6 7.9
Railway bridge 17 1.4% 0 0
Subway station - unspecified 16 1.2% 1.1 5.8
Distribution and Average Lethality 
for all 1,211 Bomb Attacks (cont.)
Target # Attacks % of Total FPD IPD
Enclosed train station 11 0.9% 0.3 5.8
Bus, school 10 0.8% 3.2 13.0
Station - train and bus 7 0.6% 1.1 5.8
Truck 5 0.4% 6.8 1.8
Enclosed subway station 5 0.4% 1.6 0
Train, trolley 4 0.3% 0 11.1
Other (not yet categorized) 4 0.3% 0 0.8
Railway signals or COM 
system 2 0.2% 0 0
Transportation company 
office 2 0.2% 0 0
Multiple targets 1 0.1% 0 0
Train, tourist 1 0.1% 8 40
Train, troop 1 0.1% 0 0
Vehicle tunnel 1 0.1% 0 0
Railway - unspecified 1 0.1% 0 0
Total/average 1211 100.0% 2.6 10.7
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There are no significant differences in distribution between all attacks and bomb attacks, 
but there are some differences in lethality. Attacks against truck convoys and government 
or company buses have the greatest lethality (6.8 FPD and 5.9 FPD, respectively), but 
again the data represent relatively few, highly focused attacks. The lethalities of bomb 
attacks against passenger train and bus targets are almost identical (both at 5.3 FPD), 
and subway trains follow at 4.0 FPD (still reflecting Madrid, London, and Moscow, but now 
without the South Korean arson event). The only target against which attacks are at or 
above average lethality is train stations (3.3 FPD), followed closely by school buses (3.2 
FPD). Lethality of attacks against bus stations is low for both all attacks and bomb attacks 
at 1.3 FPA and 1.3 FPD, respectively. 
The average lethality for all attacks is 3.8 FPA and 11.8 IPA. This is higher than the average 
lethality for bomb attacks (3.3 FPA and 13.6 IPA), probably because of the frequency and 
lethality of assaults with automatic weapons, multiple weapons (e.g., the use of an IED or 
a blockade), and high-lethality attacks such as execution-style killings. While bombs may 
be the preferred method of conducting terrorism, they are not the most lethal means of 
attacking public surface transportation. 
Distribution and Lethality by Type of Attack and Weapon
Figures 26 and 27 show distribution and lethality of all categorized means of attacking 
public surface transportation.13
Explosive and incendiary devices are used in the most attacks, as noted above. Unspecified 
IEDs are used in 62 percent of the attacks, and 74 percent of all attacks involve IEDs, 
IIDs, or vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDS). The next most common method is the use of readily 
available (in some countries) automatic assault weapon (10 percent), followed by arson
Figure 26
All Attacks: Distribution and Average Lethality by 
Attack and Weapon
Attack and Weapon # % of Total FPA IPA
IED - unspecified 1,015 62.16% 3.2 14.4
Assault with automatic weapons 163 9.98% 5.5 6.6
Arson 56 3.43% 3.6 3.2
IED - mine 47 2.88% 5.4 11.1
IED - grenade 45 2.76% 2.1 12.4
IID (improvised incendiary device) 45 2.76% 2.3 3.8
Armed hijacking 34 2.08% 0.9 0.8
Multiple weapons 34 2.08% 19.8 25.4
VBIED 31 1.90% 3.3 12.6
Robbery 30 1.84% 0.7 0.8
Assault - other or unspecified 21 1.29% 5.9 4.8
Sabotage through derailing 20 1.22% 8.0 20.2
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Figure 27
(3.4 percent), then armed hijacking and multiple-weapons assault—which often starts with 
an IED (2 percent). A few methods account for most of the attacks. 
Trends in lethality are different. Attacks with multiple weapons (19.8 FPA) and Claymore 
mines (19.3 FPA) are the most lethal, followed by sabotage through derailing (i.e., 
mechanical sabotage), which can be surprisingly lethal (8.0 FPA), and other assaults, 
which include executions in which all the occupants of a bus or train are killed (5.9 FPA). 
The more commonly used automatic assault weapons and mines planted on roads or on 
railway tracks are about equally lethal (5.5 FPA and 5.4 FPA, respectively). Slightly below 
the average are arson (3.6 FPA) and the most commonly used attack method, unspecified 
IED (3.2 FPA).
BOMB ATTACKS AgAINST ALL SURFACE TRANSPORTATION TARgETS
As shown in Figure 28, 85.5 percent of all bomb attacks involve a single bomb; this seems 
to be a constant with no evolving trend over time. It should be noted that some of the 
attacks involving multiple devices were aimed at the same target, possibly indicating 
attempts at redundancy, and because of the way the data are entered in the database, 
a few are single-device attacks against identical targets at the same time. Also, some of 
the multiple-device attacks were designed so that one or more devices detonated just as 
responders or explosives personnel arrived on the scene. 
All Attacks: Distribution and Average Lethality by 
Attack and Weapon (cont.)
Attack and Weapon # % of Total FPA IPA
IED - dynamite 20 1.22% 1.2 1.1
Kidnapping 17 1.04% 0.8 0.5
Sabotage, other 17 1.04% 2.1 0.4
Assault with RPg 12 0.73% 0.9 2.0
IED – Claymore mine 7 0.43% 19.3 25.9
Other (not yet categorized) 6 0.37% 1.8 5.2
Unknown (no description found) 4 0.24% 0.3 0.8
Threat, bomb 3 0.18% 0 0
Mortar 3 0.18% 0.7 3.3
IED - other 1 0.06% 0 0
Unconventional weapons 1 0.06% 0 0
Sniperor other standoff attacks 0 0.00% 0 0
Total/average 1,633 100.00% 3.8 11.8
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Figure 28
Figure 29 provides more detail on the number of bombs used in various attacks. The 
highest number, 10, was recorded in the attack in Madrid on March 11, 2004.
Figure 29
Single or Multiple Bombs
Bomb 
Attacks # % of Total
Single bombs 1,036 85.5%
Multiple bombs 175 14.5%
All bomb attacks 1,211 100.0%
85% are single bomb attacks, no trends over time
Number of Devices: Number and Percentage of All 
Bomb Attacks
# of Devices # of Attacks % of  Attacks
1 1,037 85.63%
2 82 6.77%
3 63 5.20%
4 13 1.07%
5 5 0.41%
6 5 0.41%
7 4 0.33%
10 1 0.08%
Total 1,211 100.00%
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Figure 30 illustrates the “outcomes” of explosive and incendiary devices used in attacks. 
The majority (77 percent) of devices are presumed to have detonated or been released 
on target. However, 6 percent of the devices did not work as planned, and 16.8 percent 
were found and rendered safe. These findings suggest that devices can be found and 
defused and passengers can be evacuated before an explosion when drivers, conductors, 
intelligence, police and security officials, and passengers are alert. In some instances, 
devices were also poorly designed. It appears that fatalism is not an appropriate response 
to explosive and incendiary devices used against public transportation.
The lethality calculations in this interim report are based on either attack or device; they are 
not yet based on explosions—where we would count only the bombs that detonated or were 
released on target. The basis of calculation can have important effects when comparing 
the lethality of different means of concealment and delivery, particularly in suicide attacks. 
Since the overwhelming majority of suicide attacks in the database detonated on target and 
on time and because suicide bombers can guide their bombs to the target, a comparison 
of lethality between bombs placed in parcels or bags or in passenger compartments of 
buses and trains with bombs carried on persons may be misleading. If we compare only 
bombs that exploded on target, as we intend to do in further work, we may find that the 
difference in lethality between bombs placed in bags or parcels or hidden in passenger 
compartments and bombs carried on persons decreases significantly.
Figure 30
Distribution and Lethality by Target
The following calculations of distribution and lethality combine target, device, and 
concealment method, as was shown in Figures 24 and 25. The lethalities of bomb attacks 
against passenger train and bus targets are almost identical (5.3 FPD), and attacks on 
Outcome of All Bomb Attacks
77% on target, 16.7% detected and rendered safe, 6% didn’t 
work as planned
Bomb Results # %  of Total
Detonated or released on target 1,184 76.73%
EOD successful - rendered safe 259 16.79%
Detonated early or away from target, or 
malfunctioned 91 5.90%
Failed to detonate or release 4 0.26%
Unknown 5 0.32%
Detonated during unsuccessful EOD 0 0.00%
Total bombs 1,543 100.00%
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subway trains follow at 4.0 FPD (reflecting Madrid, London, and Moscow, but not the 
South Korean arson incident). Train stations are the only target with at or above average 
lethality (3.3 FPD), followed closely by school buses (3.2 FPD). Bus station lethality is low 
for both all attacks and bomb attacks—1.3 FPA and 1.3 FPD, respectively. 
Distribution and Lethality by Device
Figure 31 shows the lethality of each device. Unspecified IEDS are the most widely used 
(83.8 percent of all devices), but Claymore mines, land mines, and VBIEDS have higher-
than-average lethality, whereas unspecified IEDs are of average lethality with 2.6 FPD 
and 11.6 IPD.
 
Figure 31
Distribution and Lethality by Delivery and Concealment Method
Figure 32 provides distribution and lethality statistics for different methods of delivery and 
concealment.
The most frequently used delivery method is placement in a bus or train passenger 
compartment, followed by placement on a train track. Concealing bombs in stations or 
placing them on vehicle roads are next most common. Placing a bomb in a parcel or 
bag, physically throwing a device (usually a grenade), or carrying one (always a suicide 
operation) follow, being used at about the same frequency. Although suicide attacks 
account for only 6.68 percent of all bomb attacks, they cause 15 percent of the fatalities and 
18.6 percent of the injuries; they are the most lethal method of delivery and concealment 
at 6.85 FPD and 34.86 IPD. This may be because relatively few suicide bombs fail to 
detonate on target and on time. It certainly reflects their greater effectiveness against bus 
targets than against train targets.
Distribution and Lethality per Device
Distribution:  Unspecified IEDs dominate
Lethality:  Claymore mines, mines and VBIEDs more lethal than 
average; unspecified IEDs at average lethality
Device # % of Total FPD IPD
IED - unspecified 1,015 83.82% 2.6 11.6
IED - mine 47 3.88% 4.6 9.5
IED - grenade 45 3.72% 1.7 9.8
IID (improvised incendiary device) 45 3.72% 1.1 1.9
VBIED 31 2.56% 3.2 12.3
IED - dynamite 20 1.65% 0.9 0.8
IED - Claymore 7 0.58% 19.3 25.9
IED - other 1 0.08% 0 0
Total/average 1,211 100% 2.6 10.7
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Figure 32
Bombs (usually VBIEDs) placed near the target are the next most lethal method of delivery, 
achieving 5.38 FPD and 14.56 IPD. Some attacks using VBIEDs are also suicide operations. 
Bombs left in parcels or bags (as was done in Madrid in 2004) follow at 4.70 FPD and 
25.84 IPD. The only other method that is significantly above the average—concealment 
in the passenger compartment of trains or buses—is also the most commonly used, and 
it achieves 3.86 FPD and 14.5 IPD. Other methods that have nearly average lethality 
include concealment in stations (2.44 FPD and 10.10 IPD) and placement (usually mines) 
on vehicle roads (2.14 FPD and 4.50 IPD). Placing a bomb in the non-passenger area of a 
train or bus has higher-than-average lethality (2.75 FPD), but this largely reflects a single 
attack against a bus that will be described later. 
The Twelve Most Lethal Combinations
We combine all three factors—devices, method of delivery and concealment, and target—
to derive the 12 most lethal combinations (Figure 33). Again, some of these findings are 
based on very few attacks and therefore show what terrorists have achieved in particular 
incidents, not what they normally do achieve. 
Concealing an unspecified IED in a parcel or bag and placing it in a passenger train is the 
only combination that was used more than 10 times in the attacks in the database and 
therefore is considered the most common. Attacks using other combinations of concealment 
and delivery include
Lethality per Placement  by Delivery/Concealment
Method # % of Total FPD IPD
Concealed/left in passenger compartments 324 26.73% 3.86 14.50
Placed on railroad track or bridge, or near a train 273 22.59% .81 3.61
Concealed/left in stations 157 12.95% 2.44 10.10
Placed on vehicle road, bridge, or in tunnel 111 9.16% 2.14 4.50
Physically thrown 84 6.93% .90 5.17
Carried on person 81 6.68% 6.84 34.86
Concealed in parcel or bags 59 4.87% 4.70 25.84
Placed near the bus or other target - unspecified 40 3.30% 5.38 14.56
Concealed/placed outside of stations 34 2.81% .35 1.87
Concealed/left at bus stop 23 1.90% .80 8.80
Unknown 9 0.74% 1.62 9.38
Concealed/placed in non-passenger areas 8 0.66% 2.75 .06
Concealed in or on vehicle 5 0.41% 1.55 9.73
Concealed/placed inside of building or office 3 0.25% 0 0
Total/average 1,211 100.00% 2.6 10.72
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A 1996 attack in Pakistan in which a bomb was placed in the gas tank of a passenger bus •	
(40 FPA).
Figure 33
A 2007 attack against the Peace Train in India, in which four gasoline bombs were used •	
(68 FPA).
A single suicide bomb used against a truck convoy carrying Chinese workers in Pakistan •	
(30 FPA).
Two attacks in Sri Lanka in which a Claymore mine was exploded on the side of the road •	
(21 and 16 FPA) (our data indicate that this method has been used thus far only in that 
campaign). 
A 1989 train attack in China in which dynamite was hidden in a toilet (20 FPA).•	
A 2007 suicide operation against a bus carrying police in Pakistan (18 FPA).•	
A motorcycle bomb used against a bus carrying military personnel in Sri Lanka (13 FPA).•	
Mines used once in Russia and twice in India against government buses (12 FPA).•	
Only three suicide bombings against passenger trains have been recorded; two of them 
were not successful, and one—conducted by the Black Widows against a commuter train 
in Moscow in 2003—killed 35 people and injured 170. (The London attacks targeted 
subway trains, and a suicide bomber attacked a subway station in Moscow in 2004.) 
Attacks Against Trains
As Figure 34 indicates, body counts are certainly a factor in attacks on trains. The 
percentage of attacks with more than 10 fatalities is slightly higher than the percentage 
for all attacks, and some bomb attacks on trains have yielded an average lethality of 24 
fatalities per bomb.
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Figure 34
Distribution and Lethality by Region and Country
Figure 35 shows the regional distribution and lethality of all the train attacks in the 
database.
Figure 35
Body Counts Count
• True also for passenger trains; but % of attacks with highest death rates is 
slightly higher: 
– 34% (vice 38%) of attacks resulted in at least 1 death
– 17% (also 17%) of attacks resulted in at least 5 death
– 11% (vice 9%) of attacks resulted in at least 10 deaths 
– Most of the remaining 66% failed or were stopped
– Some railway bridge or track bombings in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and some (IRA) 
in UK appear designed to disrupt rail systems
• Average deaths and injuries against passenger rail targets:
– for all attacks are 5 and 20 per attack
– for all bomb attacks are 4 and 16 per attack, and 3 and 16 per explosion
• however, 68% of bomb attacks failed or resulted in no casualties
• Some of the most deadly bomb attacks have yielded an average body count of 
24 per bomb
All Train Attacks: Regional Distribution and 
Lethality
Region # % of Total FPA IPA
South Asia 180 34.48% 7 25
Western Europe 124 23.75% 3 25
Russia and the NIS 60 11.49% 3 15
Middle East and North Africa 57 10.92% 3 8
Southeast Asia 32 6.13% 7 18
South America 23 4.41% 1 4
Sub-Saharan Africa 17 3.26% 28 33
Eastern Europe 12 2.30% 0 1
East Asia 8 1.53% 28 20
North America 7 1.34% 1 14
Australasia & Oceania 2 0.38% 0 2
Central America & Caribbean 0 0.00% 0 0
Central Asia 0 0.00% 0 0
Total/average 522 100.00% 4 12
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As shown in Figure 36, there are some differences in regional distribution between all 
attacks against trains and all attacks against all targets. Although trains have not yet been 
attacked in the United States with great frequency or lethality, recent plots involving the 
subway or commuter rail systems of major U.S. cities have been uncovered.
With the exception of South Asia, the four regions where attacks have had above-average 
lethality, shown in Figure 37, were not where the bulk of the attacks took place. Obviously, 
the lethality of attacks in North America is very low.
Figures 38 and 39 show the distribution and lethality of all train attacks and bomb attacks 
on trains in the countries where the most incidents have occurred.
For all train attacks, distribution follows a fairly predictable pattern. Among developing 
countries, India and Pakistan have the highest percentage of attacks, followed by Turkey, 
Thailand, Sri Lanka, Egypt, and Algeria. India experiences a large number of train attacks, 
but that is not surprising given the extensive use of railroads in India and the size of the 
country. Among developed countries, Russia—which has been dealing with Chechen 
separatists—has had the largest number of train attacks, followed by the United Kingdom 
(dealing with IRA and IRA dissident groups, and now with al Qaeda affiliates), Spain 
(dealing with the Basque separatist organization ETA and also jihadist groups), and then 
Germany, Israel (with a small but important train system), and Italy. Only five attacks have 
occurred in North America.
Figure 36
Where:  Regional Distribution
• Trains a major target but not yet in North America
• Top 5 Regions & North America for all train attacks
– South Asia: 180 (34.48%)
– Western Europe: 124 (23.75%)
– Russia and the NIS 60 (11.49%)
– Middle East & North Africa:  57 (10.92%)
– Southeast Asia:  32 (  6.13%)
– North America:  (10th) 7   (1.34%)
• Regional distribution was different for all attacks 
– South Asia remained first 516 (31.60%)
– Western Europe was 3rd region 218 (13.35%)
– Russia and the NIS was 5th region 137   (8.39%)
– Middle East and North Africa was 2nd region    310 (18.98%) 
– Southeast Asia was 4rd region 156   (9.55%)
– North America was in 11th position for all attacks 15  (0.92%)
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Figure 37
Figure 38
Where:  Regional Lethality
• Four regions are above average lethality (4 FTA and 12 IPA) and except for South 
Asia are not where the bulk of the attacks take place
– Sub-Saharan Africa 28 FTA/33 IPA
– East Asia 28 FTA/20 IPA
– South Asia: 7 FTA/25 IPA
– Southeast Asia 7 FTA/18 IPA
• Lethality in North America fairly low but not as low as other regions
• Regional lethality for all attacks less (and only 2 above average) but relative 
ranking fairly similar 
– East Asia was first 12 FTA/12 ITA
– Sub-Saharan Africa was second 10 FTA/10 ITA
– South Asia was third 5 FTA/16 ITA
– The Middle East and North Africa was fourth (and below   
– Average) 3 FTA/11ITA
– Southeast Asia was fifth 3 FTA/8 ITA
• North America was lower relative to other regions 0 FTA/2 ITA
All Train Attacks – 10 Leading Countries
Rank Developing # % ofTotal
FP
A IPA Developed #
% of 
Total
FP
A IPA
1 India 127 24.42% 8.0 27.5 Russia 52 10.00% 3.3 16.6
2 Pakistan 37 7.12% 3.9 12.5 U.K. 39 7.50% 1.1 18.9
3 Turkey 18 3.46% 0.9 5.9 Spain 23 4.42% 7.8 78.3
4 Thailand 14 2.69% 0.5 5.1 France 22 4.23% 0.9 8.3
5 Sri Lanka 13 2.50% 9.8 31.5 germany 13 2.50% 0.2 0.9
6 Egypt 12 2.31% 1.5 9.8 Israel 11 2.12% 0.6 5.5
7 Algeria 11 2.12% 5.8 15.3 Italy 10 1.92% 11.1 32.9
8 Cambodia 7 1.35% 27.6 55.4 U.S. 5 0.96% 0.2 13.8
9 Peru 5 0.96% 2.2 10.6 Switzerland 5 0.96% 0 0.8
10 Bangladesh 4 0.77% 6.3 21.8 Austria 3 0.58% 0 2.0
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Figure 39
Lethality follows a somewhat different pattern. The average lethality for all train attacks 
is 5.5 FPA, and the country with the highest FPA is Cambodia. A number of attacks were 
made against Cambodian trains by the Khmer Rouge, including an attack involving a 
bomb and assault weapons used against a passenger train in 1980 in which 150 people 
were killed and 250 people were injured. The next most lethal attacks occurred in Italy 
(11.1 FPA), largely reflecting a deadly bombing in the Bologna train station in 1980, 
followed by Sri Lanka, which suffered lethal bombings and multiple attacks by LTTE. 
India, which suffered the largest percentage of attacks, had an average fatality rate of 8.0 
FPA, followed by Spain at 7.8 FPA (reflecting the 2004 Madrid attacks), then Algeria (5.8 
FPA), where multiple attacks have been made against trains. All other countries, including 
the United Kingdom, had below-average lethality, demonstrating the extent to which the 
IRA targeted trains to create economic havoc and not to generate body counts.
The relative ranking of both developing and developed countries having more than 10 
bomb attacks against trains are similar to those for all train attacks. However, Israel drops 
off the list. North America experienced only four attacks.
The highest lethality was recorded in Italy (12.3 FPD), again reflecting the Bologna station 
bombing, followed by Spain (10.0 FPD), reflecting the Madrid bombings. The next most 
lethal attacks took place in India (7.7 FPD), Algeria (6.5 FPD), Pakistan (3.5 FPD), and 
Russia (3.4 FPD). The average lethality was 3.5 FPD. 
Train bombings are the only incidents in which developed countries (Italy and Spain) 
suffered the highest lethality, and in which developed countries such as Russia have 
suffered lethality close to that of developing countries such as Pakistan. 
Train Bomb Attacks – 10 Leading Countries
Rank Developing # % of Total
FP
D IPD Developed #
% of
Total FPD IPD
1 India 110 25.35% 7.7 28.5 Russia 50 11.52% 3.4 17.3
2 Pakistan 28 6.45% 3.5 14.1 U.K. 38 8.76% 1.1 19.4
3 Turkey 15 3.46% 1.0 6.5 Spain 18 4.15% 10.0 100.1
4 Sri Lanka 12 2.76% 7.6 34.1 France 16 3.69% 1.3 11.4
5 Thailand 10 2.30% 0.5 6.7 germany 9 2.07% 0 1.2
6 Algeria 10 2.30% 6.4 16.8 Italy 9 2.07% 12.3 36.6
7 Egypt 7 1.61% 2.6 14.3 Switzerland 5 1.15% 0 0.8
8 Ethiopia 6 1.38% 1.2 2.8 U.S. 4 0.92% 0 1.0
9 Philippines 5 1.15% 2.2 23.0 greece 3 0.69% 0 0
10 Brazil 4 0.92% 0 7.8 Japan 3 0.69% 0 0.3
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Distribution and Lethality by Method of Attack
Distribution and lethality by method of attack are shown in Figure 40.
Figure 40
As shown in Figure 41, explosive attacks dominate frequency in passenger train attacks 
more than in all attacks. Still, explosives are not the most lethal method of attack, and in 
fact the lethality of unspecified IEDs is below the overall average (Figure 42).
Distribution and Lethality by Target
Figure 43 shows the distribution and lethality of attacks on specific train targets. Attacks 
on subway trains and passenger trains are the most lethal, and these are the only targets 
for which lethality of attacks is above average.
BOMB ATTACKS AgAINST TRAINS
In contrast to attacks against buses (discussed below), suicide bombers may not be the 
greatest threat against trains, as indicated in Figure 44.
The suicide method of delivering a bomb (“carried on person”) is more lethal than average, 
but so are bombs concealed in passenger compartments or in parcels or bags (see Figure 
45). Data on the other aspects of bombs placed on trains are roughly the same as those 
for all bomb attacks against all targets.
How: Distribution and Lethality of All Attacks
Attack and Weapon # % of Total FPA IPA
IED - unspecified 396 75.86% 4 22
Assault with automatic weapons 26 4.98% 6 13
Sabotage through derailing 15 2.87% 11 27
IID (improvised incendiary device) 11 2.11% 6 6
IED - mine 11 2.11% 4 8
Arson 9 1.72% 22 16
Multiple weapons 10 1.92% 48 57
IED - grenade 6 1.15% 0 2
Assault - other or unspecified 6 1.15% 0 9
Sabotage, other 6 1.15% 0 0
IED - dynamite 5 0.96% 4 2
VBIED 5 0.96% 1 6
Assault with RPg, armed hijacking 4 0.77% each 1 each 1 each
Robbery 3 0.57% 1 0
Threat, bomb, other (not yet categorized) 2 0.38% each 0 each 0 each
Unconventional weapons 1 0.19% 0 0
Total/average 522 100.00% 6 20
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Figure 41
Figure 42
How: All Attacks and Train Attacks – Distribution
– All attacks: Explosives and incendiaries dominate.  Automatic 
weapons and fire are used next.  Multiple weapons often include 
bombs. Top 6:
• IEDs, IIDs & 31 VBIEDS: 74.16%
• Automatic weapons: 9.93%
• Arson 3.43%
• Armed hijacking 2.08%
• Multiple weapons (often include bombs) 2.02%
• Robbery 1.84%
– Passenger train attacks:  Explosives really dominate, followed by 
automatic weapons, mechanical derailing, and then fire. Top 6:
• IEDs, IIDs & 4 VBIEDS: 83.14% 
• Automatic weapons: 4.98%
• Mechanical derailing: 2.87%
• IIDs 2.11%
• Arson 1.72%
• Multiple weapons (often includes bombs) 1.92%
How: All Attacks and Train Attacks – Lethality
All attacks:  Most lethal attacks (above average of 4 FPA and 12 IPA)
• Multiple weapons (bombs/assault weapons) 20 FPA/25 IPA
• Claymores – Sri Lanka exclusively 19 FPA/26 IPA
• Mechanical sabotage 8 FPA/20 IPA
• Assault (other) – usually executions) 6 FPA/ 5 IPA
• Mines 5 FPA/11 IPA
• Assault with automatic weapons 5 FPA/  7 IPA
Passenger train attacks:  Most lethal attacks (above average of 6 FPA and 
20 IPA)
• Multiple weapons even more lethal 48 FPA/57 IPA
• Arson (includes 2003 South Korea subway fire) 22 FPA/16 IPA
• Mechanical sabotage 11 FPA/27 IPA
• Assault with automatic weapons 6 FPA/13 IPA
• Improvised incendiary device 6 FPA/  6 IPA
• All other attack methods, including IED – unspecified (4 FPA/22 IPA) below 
overall average 
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Figure 43
 
Figure 44
Most Lethal Train Targets
Enclosed locations most lethal; subway and then passenger trains most 
lethal and above average
Target # % of Total FPA IPA
Train, passenger (intercity or commuter) 318 60.92% 6.7 24.5
train station - unspecified 126 24.14% 3.3 12.1
Subway station - unspecified 20 3.83% 0.9 4.7
Train, subway 21 4.02% 13.2 38.7
Train station – enclosed building 13 2.49% 0.2 4.9
Station - train and bus 8 1.53% 1.0 6.8
Train, trolley 6 1.15% 0 9.6
Train, tourist 5 0.96% 2.0 11.4
Subway station – enclosed building 5 0.96% 1.6 0
Total overall average 522 100.00% 5.5 20
Passenger Train Attacks Using Explosives:  
The Bombs and Bombers
• Suicide bombers may not be our biggest problem:  suicides 
constitute a small percentage of attacks, even fewer than for all 
attacks against surface transport:
– 4.96% of all attacks  
– 3.45% of all attacks on trains  
– 6.69% of all explosive attacks on trains
• For all attacks, they cause a somewhat disproportionate 
percentage of casualties; but for attacks on trains and 
explosives attacks on trains, fatalities are roughly proportional 
to attacks:
– 9.76% of all fatalities and 15.95% of all injuries for all attacks 
– 3.68% of all fatalities and 8.64% of all injuries for all attacks on 
trains 
– 5.71% of all fatalities and 10.09% of all injuries for train attacks 
using explosives
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Figure 45
Distribution and Lethality by Target
The distribution and lethality of bomb attacks against train targets are shown in Figure 46. 
Figure 46
The Bombs and Bombers (cont.)
• In train attacks, suicide yields an average of 1.5 FPD more than
the average (3.5 FPD), but so do bombs concealed in 
passenger compartments or in parcels or bags 
• Number of bombs used:
– Only 12.7% of attacks used more than 1 device
– No discernible trends over time
• Successful Bombs:
– 72.35% of bombs successful
– 17.28% percent found – EOD successful
– 7.83% detonated early or away from primary target
– 1.84% failed to detonate
– 0.23% (1) detonated during unsuccessful EOD
What:  Distribution and Lethality by Train Targets
Subtarget # % of Total FPA IPA
Train, passenger (intercity or 
commuter) 251 57.83% 4.2 20.3
Train station - unspecified 119 27.42% 2.7 10.3
Train, subway 20 4.61% 3.3 27.7
Subway station - unspecified 16 3.69% 1.1 5.8
Train station – enclosed building 11 2.53% 0.2 4.6
Station - train and bus 7 1.61% 0.9 6.0
Subway station – enclosed building 5 1.15% 1.6 0
Train, trolley 4 0.92% 0 11.1
Train, tourist 1 0.23% 8.0 40.0
Total/average 434 100.00% 3.5 16.7
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Attacks on passenger and subway trains dominate distribution and, except for attacks 
on tourist trains (which are relatively rare), also are the most lethal train attacks (see 
Figure 47). These figures reflect the Madrid and London attacks, showing the effect of 
recent and major attacks on overall lethality.
Figure 47
Distribution and Lethality by Device
 
Figure 48 shows the distribution and lethality of explosive and incendiary devices used 
against train targets. The overall lethality of these devices—often used in enclosed areas—
is greater than average. Unspecified IEDs are more lethal in train attacks than in all bomb 
attacks, and not only do they dominate distribution, they are the only device with above-
average lethality for such attacks.
Distribution and Lethality by Delivery and Concealment Method
Figure 49 provides distribution and lethality figures for methods of delivery and concealment 
of devices used in train bomb attacks. 
The most frequent method of concealment of bombs is placement in passenger 
compartments (31.8 percent), then placement on tracks (25.1 percent), then concealment 
or placement in stations (21.2 percent). Other methods with more than 10 recorded 
attempts include leaving bombs in parcels or bags (7.8 percent), placing a bomb (or 
VBIED) outside of a station (5.3 percent), and finally, suicide bombers (4.15 percent). The 
rest of the methods have been used fewer than 10 times in events in the database. Thus, 
concealment methods for trains have about the same distribution as that for all bomb 
attacks.
What:  Most Lethal Targets
Distribution:
• Passenger trains account for more than half of bomb attacks and, along with 
their stations, account for 85% of attacks
• Subways follow and, along with subway stations, account for another 8.3%
Lethality: 
• After tourist trains, lethality matches distribution  
• Only tourist and passenger trains are above the average, and 
subway trains are about average:
– Tourist trains 8.0 FPD/40.0 IPD
– Passenger trains (includes 3/11/04 Madrid) 4.2 FPD/20.3 IPD
– Subway trains (includes 7/7/05 London) 3.3 FPD/23.7 IPD
– Enclosed (underground) subway stations 1.6 FPD/  0.0 IPD
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Figure 48
Figure 49
How: Most Lethal Devices – Trains
Distribution:  Unspecified IEDs dominate
Lethality:  Overall lethality about the same – 3 FPD
• Unspecified IED more lethal (3.6 FPD versus 2.6 FPD)—only device above 
average; for all attacks, only device above average was mines (3.5 FPD versus 
4.6 FPD)
• IIDs next most lethal for trains and more lethal than for all attacks (3.4 FPD 
versus 1.1 FPD); VBIEDS understandably less lethal (1.4 FPD versus 3.2 FPD) 
Device # % ofTotal FPD IPD
IED - unspecified 396 91.24% 3.6 18.2
IID (improvised incendiary device) 11 2.53% 3.4 3.3
IED -mine 11 2.53% 2.7 5.9
IED - dynamite 6 1.38% 2.0 1.1
VBIED 5 1.15% 1.4 6.4
IED - grenade 5 1.15% 0.3 1.5
Total/overall average 434 100% 3.5 16.7
Delivery/Concealment Method – Train Bomb Attacks
Concealment/Delivery Method # % of Total FPD IPD
Concealed/left in pax compartments 138 31.80% 5.0 20.2
Placed on railroad track 109 25.12% 1.9 9.0
Concealed/left in stations 92 21.20% 3.4 12.4
Concealed in parcel or bags 34 7.83% 5.5 38.9
Concealed/placed outside of stations 23 5.30% 0.4 2.0
Carried on person 18 4.15% 5.3 45.2
Physically thrown 7 1.61% 0.1 3.1
Concealed/placed in non-pax areas 5 1.15% 0.6 0.1
Unknown (not described) 3 0.69% 3.0 28.0
Concealed in or on vehicle 2 0.46% 0 1.5
Placed near target - unspecified 2 0.45% 0.5 9.5
Concealed inside of building or office 1 0.23% 0 0
Total/average 434 100.00% 3.5 16.7
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The most notable difference between lethality in train bomb attacks and that in all bomb 
attacks is that concealing a bomb in the passenger compartment of a train or in a bag or 
parcel is about as lethal as a suicide bombing. 
 
The Twelve Most Lethal Combinations
The 12 most lethal combinations of target, device, and delivery and concealment method 
for passenger train targets are shown in Figure 50.
As in the case of all bomb attacks, the most lethal combinations in train attacks (e.g., the 
2007 Peace Train attack, the dynamite bombing in China, and the female suicide bomber in 
the Moscow subway) are not necessarily the most commonly used. Attacks against tourist 
trains are rare (with an average lethality of 8 FPA), and the unknown attacks include one 
particularly lethal attack against a train station in Sri Lanka (5 FPA) in which the attackers 
used a method that is not described in the source material.
The methods of concealment and delivery that are used most commonly or that have been 
used in particularly notorious attacks include the following: 
The most lethal method that has been used in more than 10 attacks is concealment of •	
bombs in parcels or bags in passenger trains, yielding an FPD of 13, higher than that of the 
suicide bombings. This method was used in the Madrid subway bombings.
Suicide bombing was used in the 2003 attack on a commuter train in Moscow (12 FPD), •	
and also in the three London subway bombs on July 7, 2005 (11 FPD) and attacks in India, 
China, Sri Lanka, Israel, Turkey, and Indonesia that yielded a relatively low FPD of 3.
The most commonly used concealment methods for train attacks are placement of a bomb •	
in the passenger compartment, used in 118 attacks in the database (6 FPD), and placement 
of a bomb in the station, used in 66 attacks (5 FPD). These data derive from a large enough 
number of attacks to be particularly relevant.
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12 Most Lethal Combinations: Trains
FPA # Target Device Delivery/Concealment
34 2 Passenger train Improvised incendiary device (IID) Carried in parcel or bags
20 1 Passenger train IED-dynamite Concealed  in pax compartment
13 17 Passenger train IED - unspecified Concealed in parcel or bags
12 3 Passenger train IED - unspecified Carried on person
11 1 Subway station IED - unspecified Carried on person
10 4 Subway train IED - unspecified Carried on person
8 1 Tourist train IED - unspecified Placed on railroad track
6 118 Passenger train IED - unspecified Concealed in pax compartment
5 66 Train station, unspecified IED - unspecified Left in station
5 2 Passenger train IED - unspecified Unknown (not described)
4 11 Subway train IED - unspecified Left in passenger compartment
3 8 Train station - unspecified IED - unspecified Carried on person
 
Figure 50
Attacks, Fatalities, and Injuries Over Time
Figures 51 and 52 show the pattern of attacks and fatalities and attacks and injuries, 
respectively, over time. There is a curious difference between attacks and fatalities 
between 1998 and 2003, and a confluence that starts again in 2005. The same pattern 
seems to exist for injuries. Further analysis is needed to explore the reasons for this.
Figure 51
Explosives Train Attacks and Fatalities Over 
Time
Train Bomb Attacks and Fatalities
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Figure 52
ATTACKS AgAINST BUSES
Distribution and Lethality by Region and Country
Figures 53 and 54 provide regional distribution and lethality calculations for all bus attacks 
and for bombing attacks against bus targets. 
Figure 53
Explosives Train Attacks and Injuries Over 
Time
Train Bomb Attacks and Injuries
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All Bus Attacks: Regional Distribution and Lethality
Region # % of Total FPA IPA
South Asia 241 30.66% 4.9 14.4
Middle East and North Africa 220 27.99% 3.7 13.4
Southeast Asia 90 11.45% 2.1 6.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 52 6.62% 6.9 4.6
South America 50 6.36% 2.4 2.1
Russia and the NIS 47 5.98% 2.7 6.6
Western Europe 30 3.82% 1.2 8.2
East Asia 20 2.54% 7.5 9.9
Eastern Europe 18 2.29% 1.1 4.9
Central America & Caribbean 12 1.53% 1.4 3.0
North America 4 0.51% 0 0
Central Asia 1 0.13% 0 2.0
Australasia & Oceania 1 0.13% 0 0
Total 786 100.00% 3.8 10.4
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Figure 54
Figures 55 and 56 compare the distribution and lethality of bomb attacks against buses 
with those of bomb attacks against all targets. Although the Middle East and North Africa 
dominate at least the Western consciousness about terrorism, this is not the most lethal 
region for either all attacks or bomb attacks against buses; its lethality is actually below 
average for all attacks and only slightly above average for bomb attacks.
Figure 55
Bus Bomb Attacks: Regional Distribution and Lethality
Region # % of Total FPD IPD
South Asia 192 38.79% 4.7 16.9
Middle East and North 
Africa 149 30.10% 3.2 16.7
Southeast Asia 59 11.92% 2.1 7.2
Russia and the NIS 31 6.26% 3.9 9.2
Western Europe 18 3.64% 1.5 13.6
East Asia 15 3.03% 9.9 13.0
South America 16 3.23% 0.9 1.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 7 1.41% 9.6 6.0
Eastern Europe 4 0.81% 3.0 14.3
Central America & 
Caribbean 2 0.40% 0 3.5
Central Asia 1 0.20% 0 2.0
Australasia & Oceania 1 0.20% 0 0
North America 0 0.00% 0 0
Total 495 100.00% 3.1 11.6
All Attacks: Regional Distribution and 
Lethality
Distribution:
• The regions with the greatest share of attacks are: South Asia (30.6%), the 
Middle East and North Africa (27.9%),  and Southeast Asia (11.4%).
• Another set of regions follow:   Sub-Saharan Africa (6.6%), South America 
(6.4%), and Russia and the NIS (5.9%).
• Western Europe follows at about 3%, then East Asia at 2.5% and Eastern Europe 
at 2.3%.
• Other regions have few attacks; North America is in 11th place with less than 1%. 
Lethality:
• The leading region is East Asia (7.5 FPA), and Sub-Saharan Africa follows (6.9 
FPA).  These are influenced by lethal bomb attacks in China and multiple 
weapons attacks in Africa. 
• The only region above average is South Asia (4.9 FPA), with the Middle East and 
North Africa slightly below average lethality at 3.7 FPA.  
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Figure 56
Figure 57 lists the 10 developed and developing countries that have experienced the most 
bus attacks of all types, and Figure 58 lists those that have had the most bomb attacks on 
bus targets. 
Figure 57
Bomb Attacks:  Regional Distribution and Lethality
• Distribution is close to bomb attacks against all targets:
– The regions with the greatest number of attacks are South Asia (39%), the 
Middle East and North Africa (30%), Southeast Asia (12%).
– Next comes Russia and the NIS (6%), followed by a set of three regions: 
Western Europe, East Asia, and South America—figures somewhat over 
3%.
• Lethality follows a different track.  The most lethal regions are
– East Asia (9.9 FPA), which includes some deadly bus attacks in China.
– Sub-Saharan Africa (9.6 FPA), with multiple weapons attacks.
– South Asia at 4.7 FPA, and then Russia and the NIS at 3.9 FPA.
– Finally, once again, the Middle East and North Africa, which dominates 
Western consciousness about terrorism directed against public transport  
because of the bus bombings in Israel, but is actually only slightly above 
average lethality at 3.2 FPA.
All Bus Attacks – Leading Countries
Developing countries suffer more; major campaigns in developed 
countries are in Israel (current) and UK (mostly past - IRA)
Rank Developing # % of total FPA IPA Developed #
% of 
total FPA IPA
1 India 93 11.83% 4.0 12.2 Israel 143 18.19% 3.5 16.6
2 Pakistan 75 9.54% 4.5 12.0 Russia 37 4.71% 3.0 5.8
3 Philippines 71 9.03% 2.0 7.1 U.K. 11 1.40% 3.2 19.8
4 Colombia 37 4.71% 2.0 1.2 greece 7 0.89% 0.1 2.3
5 Sri Lanka 35 4.45% 9.6 10.3 France 4 0.51% 0 0
6 Turkey 23 2.93% 3.7 10.3 Spain 3 0.38% 0 0
7 Algeria 23 2.93% 8.3 10.1 Japan 2 0.25% 0 0.5
8 Egypt 20 2.54% 1.3 5.1 Poland 2 0.25% 0 0
9 China 16 2.04% 9.3 12.2 Canada 2 0.25% 0 0
10 Indonesia 13 1.65% 1.0 2.7 Bosnia 1 0.13% 0 0
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Figure 58
Clearly, with the exception of Israel, the majority of the attacks have taken place in developing 
countries. Also notable are campaigns in Russia (largely by Chechen separatists) and 
the United Kingdom. Attacks in the United Kingdom included a jihadist attack on July 7, 
2005, and—although the IRA generally avoided transportation attacks that generated 
large civilian casualties, particularly in Great Britain itself—one IRA bus bomb in 1974 in 
England that killed 11 soldiers, and another execution-style assault in Northern Ireland in 
1976 that killed 10 Protestant workers. 
For developing countries, the only significant shift in ranking (more than two positions) 
occurred as a result of the increase in bomb attacks in China and the decrease in Colombia 
and Egypt. For developed countries, the rankings shifted very little when there were more 
than three attacks. 
The list of countries with the most attacks reflects the presence of terrorist campaigns 
that have included public bus transportation targets. While the largest single terrorist 
group listed in the MTI database is “unknown,” because of the lack of claims or suspicions 
confirmed by authorities, specific organizations and generic groups seem to be primarily 
responsible for attacks against bus targets in these countries. In developing countries, 
campaigns appear to be dominated by the following organizations and groups: 
Bus Bomb Attacks – Leading Countries
Some changes in developing countries; no significant changes in 
developed countries
Rank Developing # % of Total FPA IPA Developed #
% of 
Total FPA IPA
1 India 70 14.14% 3.0 14.5 Israel 110 22.22% 3.8 19.3
2 Pakistan 65 13.13% 4.4 13.7 Russia 26 5.25% 4.2 8.0
3 Philippines 52 10.51% 2.0 8.3 U.K. 7 1.41% 3.6 31.0
4 Sri Lanka 30 6.06% 9.6 13.9 greece 5 1.01% 0.2 3.2
5 China 14 2.83% 10.6 13.9 France 3 0.61% 0 0
6 Turkey 14 2.83% 1.8 13.7 Estonia 1 0.20% 1.0 10.0
7 Colombia 12 2.42% 1.0 1.8 Italy 1 0.20% 0 0
8 Algeria 10 2.02% 0.8 16.2 Sweden 1 0.20% 0 0
9 Egypt 8 1.62% 0.1 2.1
10 Indonesia 8 1.62% 1.6 3.4
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In•	 dia. Kashmiri and Sikh separatists, Naga and other tribal separatists, Islamic extremists 
and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), and Maoists. 
Pakistan•	 . Baloch Liberation Army, Islamic extremists and separatists, and, in earlier 
decades, Afghan government agents.
The Philippines•	 . The MLF and the New People’s Army, particularly in Mindanao. 
Colombia•	 . FARC and the National Liberation Army.
Sri Lanka•	 . LTTE.
Turkey•	 . PKK (Kurdish separatists). 
Algeria•	 . The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Islamic extremists.
Egypt•	 . Al-Gamya and other Islamic extremists.
China•	 . Muslim separatists. 
Indonesia•	 . The Free Aceh Movement (GAM).
In the developed countries, the following organizations and groups—in addition to deranged 
individuals—are primarily responsible for attacks on public transportation: 
Israel, the West Bank, and gaza Strip•	 . Hamas, Hizballah, Palestinian Jihad, the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine and its various factions, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigade. 
Russian Federation•	 . Chechen separatists. 
The United Kingdom of great Britain and Northern Ireland•	 . the Provisional, Real, and 
Continuity IRA, al Qaeda-inspired conspiracies. 
greece•	 . ELA and other left-wing groups.
Spain, France, and Italy•	 . Basque separatists.
Poland•	 . Robbers. 
Estonia•	 . One bomber.
Japan•	 . Deranged individuals.
Canada•	 . A disturbed Lebanese Christian who hijacked a bus (the incident was resolved 
peacefully in front of Parliament Square in Ottawa) and a recent criminal hijacking of a bus 
in Edmonton. 
For U.S. stakeholders who have a tendency to see all terrorism as directed against 
Americans and their allies by “Middle Easterners,” these figures provide some interesting 
contrasts.
First, terrorist attacks have taken place in a number of Islamic countries, including Egypt, 
Algeria, Indonesia, and Pakistan.
Second, the ideological motivation of the attacking groups runs from religious (Hamas 
and Hizballah in Israel, LeT in Pakistan, and al Qaeda), to groups advocating secular 
independence (LTTE in Sri Lanka, PKK in Turkey, Chechen fighters in the Russian 
Federation), to Marxist or left-wing groups (FARC and NLA in Colombia, MLF in the 
Philippines, and ELA in Greece). 
Third, if there is a common thread, it is the desire for some kind of local, regional, or 
national independence or autonomy. Although groups communicate, observe and imitate 
tactics, sometimes provide funding, and even form alliances (often uneasy), most terrorist 
campaigns, like politics and many wars, are local in their objectives and have to be 
understood locally, not simply with broad brushstrokes. 
Fourth, some of most bloody campaigns have been conducted outside of the Islamic orbit, 
most notably by LTTE in Sri Lanka. 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute Nat ional  Transportat ion Secur i ty Center of  Excel lence
Trends in Attacks on Surface Transportation54
Thus, while terrorism against public transportation, including and perhaps especially bus 
transportation, has increased, this is the result of different campaigns, born out of different 
grievances. Nevertheless, the tactics are known, communicated, imitated, or improved 
upon as the general threshold against attacks involving innocent civilians erodes. It is 
alleged, for example, that LTTE in Sri Lanka, which may have observed Hamas’s first 
suicide car bombs during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, invented the suicide belt 
and first used female suicide bombers, two tactics that were then adopted and enhanced 
by Hizballah, Hamas, and other groups in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank.
Distribution and Lethality by Type of Attack and Weapon
Figures 59 and 60 show distribution and lethality by type of attack for all bus attacks. 
Figure 59 indicates that explosives and incendiary devices are the weapons most widely 
used in bus attacks, being used in 63 percent of the attacks since 1970; automatic 
weapons were used in about 16 percent, arson in 5 percent, and armed hijacking and 
robbery (combined) in 7 percent. Many of the “multiple attacks” involve a combination of 
explosives and sometimes incendiaries, followed by assault with automatic weapons. 
The highest lethality was achieved by LTTE’s use of Claymore mines in Sri Lanka, yielding 
an FPD of 10.8. The next highest figure comes from two attacks, one of which was the 
sabotage of a tour bus (which sources do not describe) in Istanbul in which 36 people 
were killed. Multiple weapons follow at 8.6 FPA, and execution-style “other assaults” at 
8.1 FPA.
The more commonly used attack methods that are above average include mines placed 
on vehicle roads ( 7.1 FPA), assault with automatic weapons 5.5 FPA), and VBIEDS used 
against buses (5.3 FPA). All of these are roughly two or more times as lethal as the most 
Figure 59
Distribution and Lethality of All Attacks
Weapon # % of Total FPA IPA
IED - unspecified 378 48.09% 3.7 14.6
Assault with automatic weapons 126 16.03% 5.5 5.6
Arson 39 4.96% 0.2 0.8
IED - grenade 37 4.71% 2.5 14.1
IID 31 3.94% 1.2 3.4
Armed hijacking 30 3.82% 0.9 0.8
Robbery 25 3.18% 0.7 1.0
IED - mine 23 2.93% 7.1 15.5
VBIED 16 2.04% 5.3 20.2
Kidnapping 16 2.04% 0.8 0.6
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Figure 60
commonly used device, the unspecified IED (3.7 FPA). This is not what one would 
expect, but it reflects the reality of bus attacks since 1970. 
Distribution and Lethality of All Attacks (cont.)
Weapon # % of Total FPA IPA
Multiple weapons 21 2.67% 8.6 12.5
Assault - other or unspecified 15 1.91% 8.1 3.2
Assault with RPg 8 1.02% 1.1 2.8
IED - dynamite 5 0.64% 0.8 2.0
IED – Claymore mine 5 0.64% 20.8 36.2
Other (not yet categorized) 4 0.51% 2.8 7.8
Unknown (not described) 3 0.38% 0.3 1.0
Mortar 2 0.25% 1.0 5.0
Sabotage, other 2 0.25% 18.0 3.5
IED - Other 0 0.00% 0 0
Total 786 100.00% 3.8 10.4
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Distribution and Lethality by Target
We next consider the frequency with which various public bus transportation targets 
have been attacked since 1970, first by all methods, and then by only explosives and 
incendiaries. 
Figure 61 provides distribution and lethality calculations by attack and weapon for all 
bus attacks. Scheduled passenger buses—including minivan and minibus scheduled 
service—have been the targets of roughly 70 percent of the attacks, and when tourist 
and school buses are included, they constitute 80 percent of the targets. Bus stations and 
bus stops have been the targets of about 20 percent of the attacks. Lethality generally 
follows distribution, with only scheduled buses, school buses, and minivans and buses 
(often a part of scheduled bus transportation in developing countries) above or close 
to the average FPA. The lethality of attacks on bus stations and bus stops is low, but 
interestingly, the lethality for bus stops (1.8 FPA) is greater than that for bus stations (1.3 
FPA).
Figure 62 provides distribution and lethality figures for bus bomb attacks. 
When only bomb attacks are considered, the percentage of attacks against scheduled bus 
service decreases to 63 percent, and that of attacks against all buses decreases to around 
70 percent; the percentages against stops and stations increase correspondingly. 
Attacks on scheduled buses (including minivans) continue to have the highest lethality, 
though somewhat less, not more, than when all attacks against buses are considered, 
and these remain the only targets above or nearly at average lethality. Tourist and school 
buses, less often hit, follow at around 2.4 FPA. Attacks on bus stops remain at 1.8 FPD, 
and attacks on bus stations fall to 1.0 FPD. 
Figure 61
Distribution and Lethality of All Bus Attacks by 
Target
Subtarget # % of Total FPA IPA
Bus, scheduled 516 65.65% 4.8 11.4
Bus station - unspecified 110 13.99% 1.3 9.5
Bus, tourist 64 8.14% 2.3 4.3
Bus stop 45 5.73% 1.8 14.4
Minivan or minibus 35 4.45% 3.5 5.7
Bus, school 16 2.04% 2.4 9.7
Enclosed or open station 0 0.00% 0 0
Total/overall average 786 100.00% 3.8 10.4
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Figure 62
In the database, the terms “bus station–enclosed building” and “bus station–open air” are 
used only when there is enough information to determine that they are in fact enclosed 
or open air. If the type of station cannot be determined from the available evidence, the 
station is coded as “unspecified.” Since most of the attacks occur in developing countries, 
it is likely that the majority of the stations are open air.
Bomb Attacks Against Buses
Figure 63 shows the proportions of attacks in which single and multiple explosive and 
incendiary devices are used and the percentage of attacks involving bombs that are 
conducted by suicide bombers.
The proportion of attacks involving a single device is quite high—about 87 percent, which is 
the same as the equivalent figure for trains. Again, multiple devices are sometimes used in 
attacks on the same target, demonstrating an attempt at redundancy, and a few—because 
of how the data are entered in the database—are single-device attacks against identical 
targets at the same time. Also, some of the multiple-device attacks were designed so that 
one or more devices detonated just as responders or explosives personnel arrived on the 
scene. 
More than 12 percent of the attacks on buses have been suicide attacks. As noted earlier, 
the percentage of bomb attacks that are suicides is far higher for bus targets than for all 
targets and especially for train targets, a reflection primarily of the campaigns in Israel, Sri 
Lanka, and, to a lesser degree, Russia.
Distribution and Lethality of Bus Bomb Attacks by 
Target
Subtarget # % of Total FPD IPD
Bus, scheduled 297 60.00% 4.4 14.1
Bus station - unspecified 106 21.41% 1.0 7.5
Bus stop 40 8.08% 1.8 13.9
Bus, tourist 24 4.85% 0.6 2.6
Minivan or minibus 18 3.64% 2.5 7.5
Bus, school 10 2.02% 3.2 13.0
Enclosed or open bus station 0 0.00% 0 0
Total/overall average 495 100.00% 3.1 11.6
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Figure 63
Figure 64 illustrates the “outcomes” of explosive and incendiary devices used in bus attacks. 
The majority (87 percent) of devices are presumed to have detonated or been released 
on target, considerably higher than the average for trains (72.8 percent) and for all targets 
(72.3 percent). Nevertheless, for bus targets, 8 percent of the devices were rendered safe, 
and 4.6 percent detonated early or away from the target or malfunctioned. Once again, 
it is important to note that devices can be found and defused and passengers can be 
evacuated before an explosion when drivers, conductors, intelligence, police and security 
officials, and passengers are alert. In some instances, devices were also poorly designed. 
Bombs and Bombers
Type # % of Total
Suicide 61 12.32%
Non-suicide 434 87.68%
Total 495 100%
The % of suicides is considerably higher than in all bomb attacks (6.69%) and 
much higher than in bomb attacks against trains  (3.45%),  most likely 
attributed to suicide campaigns in Israel, Sri Lanka, and Russia
Single or Multiple # %  of Total
Single 63 12.73%
Multiple 432 87.27%
Total 495 100.00%
The % of single bombs is about the same as for all bomb attacks and all 
train bomb attacks
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Figure 64
Distribution and Lethality by Device
Figure 65 shows the distribution and lethality of devices used against bus targets. 
Unspecified IEDs are used most commonly, but Claymore mines, land mines, and VBIEDs 
are the most lethal, followed by unspecified IEDs, which have slightly above-average 
lethality. All other devices have below-average lethality.
Figure 65
Bombs and Bombers (cont.)
Outcomes # % of Total
Detonated or released on target 432 87.27%
EOD successful - rendered safe 40 8.08%
Detonated early or away from 
target or malfunctioned 23 4.65%
Total 495 100.00%
Bombs appear to detonate on target and on time more 
frequently against buses (87.27%) than against all targets 
(76.81%) and against trains (72.31%)
Bomb Attacks: Distribution and Lethality by Device
Distribution: Unspecified IEDs predominate, followed by 
grenades, IIDs, mines and VBIEDs.
Lethality: Claymores (unique to Sri Lanka) most lethal, 
followed by mines on roads, and then VBIEDS, and finally 
unspecified IEDs – all others below average lethality
Weapon # % of Total FPD IPD
IED - unspecified 378 76.36% 3.2 12.6
IED - grenade 37 7.47% 1.9 10.6
IID 31 6.26% 0.5 1.6
IED - mine 23 4.64% 7.1 15.5
VBIED 16 3.23% 5.3 20.2
IED - dynamite 5 1.01% 0.6 1.4
IED – Claymore mine 5 1.01% 20.8 36.2
IED - other 0 0 0.0 0.0
Total 495 100% 3.1 11.6
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Distribution and Lethality by Target
The distribution and lethality for bomb attacks against bus targets were shown in Figure 
62. Attacks on scheduled buses (including minivans) had the highest lethality. Attacks on 
tourist and school buses, which have been attacked less often, follow at around 2.4 FPD. 
Attacks on bus stops achieved 1.8 FPD and were more lethal than attacks on bus stations 
(1.0 FPD). 
Distribution and Lethality by Delivery and Concealment Method
Figure 66 shows the distribution and lethality of various methods of delivery and 
concealment. 
Figure 66
Placing a bomb in the passenger compartment is the most common method, followed 
by throwing grenades, hiding bombs in stations, and delivery via a suicide bomber. 
Other techniques include parcel bombs, land mines, and attacks at bus stops. As 
shown in Figure 67, Claymore mines have the greatest lethality, but unlike the case 
of trains, suicide bombers are the most lethal means of attack on buses that occurred 
more than 50 times—twice as deadly as placing bombs in passenger compartments.
Distribution and Lethality by Concealment and 
Delivery
Method # % of Total FPD IPD
Concealed/left in pax compartments 173 34.9% 3.2 10.8
Physically thrown 71 14.3% 1.0 5.3
Concealed/left in stations 64 12.9% 0.2 1.6
Carried on person 61 12.3% 6.8 32.5
Placed on vehicle road 35 7.1% 6.2 14.7
Placed near the bus or other target 28 5.7% 7.2 20.6
Concealed in parcel or bags 24 4.8% 4.3 7.8
Concealed/left at bus stop 23 4.6% 0.8 8.8
Concealed/placed outside of stations 10 2.0% 0.2 1.6
Unknown (not described) 4 0.8% 1.0 5.0
Concealed/placed in non-pax areas 2 0.4% 5.0 0
Total/average 495 100.0% 3.1 11.6
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Figure 67
The Twelve Most Lethal Combinations
Figure 68 presents the 12 most lethal combinations of target, device, and concealment 
method for bus attacks. Again, some of these combinations reflect very few attacks and 
therefore show what terrorists have achieved in particular instances, not what they normally 
achieve. 
For bus attacks, the combinations used in small numbers of attacks that provided greater 
average lethality than the most common methods include the following:
A 1996 attack in Pakistan (40 fatalities), in which a bomb was placed near the gasoline tank 1. 
of a bus.
Two attacks involving Claymore mines in Sri Lanka (21 and 20 fatalities), one against a 2. 
scheduled bus and the other against a government bus.
One 2007 suicide operation against a bus carrying police in Pakistan (18 fatalities).3. 
Two instances in which flammable devices ignited in passenger buses (perhaps accidentally) 4. 
in China in 1994 (an average of 14 fatalities). 
A motorcycle bomb in Sri Lanka used against a government bus (13 fatalities).5. 
Mines used once in Russia and twice in India against government buses (an average of 12 6. 
fatalities). 
The most lethal attacks with more commonly used combinations on scheduled buses 
Distribution and Lethality: Delivery and 
Concealment
Distribution
– Concealing in passenger compartment dominates means
– Physically throwing grenades, concealing bombs in stations, and 
carrying them in person (suicide) follow
– Placing on vehicle road (usually mines), concealing in parcels or 
bags or at bus stops follow
Lethality
– Bombs (Claymores) placed on bus most lethal: 7.2 FPD
– Suicide bombs next more lethal (6.8 FPD), and most lethal 
method when there are more than 50 attacks and twice as 
lethal as concealment in pax areas (3.2 FPD)
– Concealment in parcels and bags (4.3 FPD) is also above 
average lethality (3.1 FPD)
– All other methods below average (except non-pax placement 
(5.0 FPD), which is from one bomb in one bus gas tank)
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involve IEDs carried in parcels or bags in 13 attacks, yielding an average of 9 FPD. The 
next most lethal were 46 attacks in which suicide bombers detonated inside of passenger 
buses, and 21 attacks in which mines were placed on vehicle roads. Seven attacks in 
Figure 68
 
which suicide bombers detonated at bus stops—not stations—achieved an average FPD 
of 7, and 6 attacks in which VBIEDS were used against buses yielded an average FPD of 
six (once again, VBIEDs can be used in suicide operations).
Suicide bombers play a more important role in bus attacks than in train attacks. When we 
consider the 12 most lethal combinations of target, device, and method of concealment 
and delivery, the most commonly used is suicide bombing on board a bus (the data are 
clearly influenced by campaigns in Israel and Sri Lanka). However, the same lethality has 
been achieved using land mines, and bombs hidden in parcels and bags are more lethal 
than suicide bombs carried on the person.
The most common combination—concealment of an IED in a passenger compartment of 
a bus, of which there were more than 120 instances—yielded an average FPD of 4, only 
half that of suicide bombers carrying IEDs and less than half that of IEDs left in parcels 
or bags. 
The final report will explore the lethality rates of various delivery and concealment 
methods when only bombs that detonated on target are considered. This may affect the 
relative lethality of suicide bombers and other commonly used methods of concealment 
and delivery.
12 Most Lethal Combinations
FPA # Target Device Delivery/Concealment
40 1 Scheduled bus IED - unspecified Concealed in non-pax areas
30 1 Truck (ersatz minibus) IED - unspecified Carried on person
21 5 Scheduled bus IED – Claymore Placed near the target
16 2 Co. or gov’t bus IED- Claymore Placed near the target
18 1 Co. or gov’t bus IED - unspecified Carried on person
13 1 Co. or gov’t bus IED - unspecified Concealed in or on vehicle (motorcycle)
12 3 Co. or gov’t bus IED - mine Placed on vehicle road
9 13 Scheduled bus IED - unspecified Concealed in parcel or bags
8 46 Scheduled bus IED - unspecified Carried on person
8 21 Scheduled bus IED - mine Placed on vehicle road
7 6 Scheduled bus VBIED Placed near the bus
7 7 Bus stop IED - unspecified Carried on person
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Attacks, Fatalities, and Injuries Over Time
Figures 69 and 70 show patterns of attacks and fatalities and patterns of attacks and 
injuries, respectively. The patterns in bus attacks track more closely than those in train 
attacks.
Figure 69
Figure 70
Bus Bomb Attacks:  Attacks and Fatalities 
Over Time
Spikes in fatalities coincide with attacks
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Bus Bomb Attacks:  Attacks and Injuries 
Over Time
Injuries also generally coincide with attacks
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APPENDIX 
NOVEMBER 12, 2009, BRIEFINg FOR DhS COUNTER-IED 
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ENDNOTES
 1.  Brian Michael Jenkins, MTI Report #97-04:  Protecting Surface Transportation Systems 
and Patrons from Terrorist Activities: Case Studies of Best Security Practices and 
a Chronology of Attacks, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, December 
1997.
 2. Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gerston, MTI Report # 01-07:  Protecting Public 
Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing Research 
on Best Security Practices, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, September 
2001.
 3. See Brian Michael Jenkins, Bruce R. Butterworth, and Jean-François Clair, MTI 
Report # 09-12: Off the Rails: The 1995 Attempted Derailing of the French TGV 
(High-Speed Train) and a Quantitative Analysis of 181 Rail Sabotage Attempts, San 
Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, March 2010.
 4. Attacks against ferries are also not included, as MTI’s current mandate extends only 
to surface or land transportation and does not include maritime transport.
 5. Although the results should not be pre-judged, a quick review of the data suggests 
that a number of attacks that resulted in no fatalities or injuries will be entered; these 
entries may decrease the average lethality of many kinds of attacks.
 6. Twice in December 1994, a disgruntled individual detonated incendiary devices on 
subway trains in New York; he was not connected to any terrorist organization.
 7. Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce R. Butterworth, MTI Report #09-03:  Potential Terrorist 
Uses of Highway-Borne Hazardous Materials, San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation 
Institute, January 2010.
 8. Ibid.
 9.  It is important to put these cases in context in terms of actual plots.  Of these 44 cases, 
24 involved actual plots.  In 19 of these 24 plots, potential targets were identified and 
operational plans discussed.  In 10, the plotters actually conducted reconnaissance, 
and in 11, they possessed, acquired, or tried to acquire explosives or other weapons, 
often without taking much care to avoid detection. 
 10. To reduce counting, the database interprets “dozens” to mean literally 24.
 11. The categorization of developed and developing countries may not fit all regions of all 
countries. Major cities of Turkey and South America are quite developed, yet the two 
countries are categorized as developing. MTI will seek a more updated approach to 
this problem in line with current economic classifications from the United States. 
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 12. Unique among fatality calculations for bomb attacks, these fatalities and injuries are 
calculated per attack (FPA and IPA), and not per device (FPD and IPD), in order 
compare general target lethality. The final database should enable calculation of 
fatality by device, by attack, and by device that explodes on target. 
 13. References to other and unknown methods indicate methods not yet categorized in 
the database and those for which the description of the attack did not include the 
method, respectively. 
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